Revision of Security Risk-oriented Patterns for Distributed Systems by Samarütel, Silver
  
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
Institute of Computer Science 
Software Engineering Curriculum 
Silver Samarütel 
Revision of Security Risk-oriented Patterns 
for Distributed Systems 
Master’s Thesis (30 ECTS) 
Supervisor: Raimundas Matulevičius 
 
  
Tartu 2016 
2 
 
Revision of Security Risk-oriented Patterns for Distributed Systems 
Abstract: 
Security risk management is an important part of software development. Given that majority 
of modern organizations rely heavily on information systems, security plays a big part in 
ensuring smooth operation of business processes. Many people rely on e-services offered 
by banks and medical establishments. Inadequate security measures in information systems 
could have unwanted effects on an organization’s reputation and on people’s lives. Security 
concerns usually need to be addressed throughout the development and lifetime of a soft-
ware system. Literature reports however, that security is often considered during implemen-
tation and maintenance stages of software development. Since security risk mitigation usu-
ally results with changes to an IS’s specification, security analysis is best done at an early 
phase of the development process. This allows an early exclusion of inadequate system de-
signs. Additionally, it helps prevent the need for fundamental and expensive design changes 
later in the development process. In this thesis, we target the secure system development 
problem by suggesting application of security risk-oriented patterns. These patterns help 
find security risk occurrences in business processes and present mitigations for these risks. 
They provide business analysts with means to elicit and introduce security requirements to 
business processes. At the same time, they reduce the efforts needed for risk analysis. We 
confront the security risk-oriented patterns against threat patterns for distributed systems. 
This allows us to refine the collection of existing patterns and introduce additional patterns 
to mitigate security risks in processes of distributed systems. The applicability of these se-
curity risk-oriented patterns is validated on business processes from aviation turnaround 
system. The validation results show that the security risk-oriented patterns can be used to 
mitigate security risks in distributed systems. 
Keywords: 
Security risk management, security patterns, security requirements engineering 
CERCS:  
T120 Systems engineering, computer technology 
Turvariskidele orienteeritud mustrite ümbertöötamine hajussüsteemi-
dele 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Turvariskide haldamine on oluline osa tarkvara arendusest. Arvestades, et enamik tänapäeva 
ettevõtetest sõltuvad suuresti infosüsteemidest, on turvalisusel oluline roll sujuvalt toimi-
vate äriprotsesside tagamisel. Paljud inimesed kasutavad e-teenuseid, mida pakuvad näiteks 
pangad ja haigekassa. Ebapiisavatel turvameetmetel infosüsteemides võivad olla soovima-
tud tagajärjed nii ettevõtte mainele kui ka inimeste eludele. 
Tarkvara turvalisusega tuleb tavaliselt tegeleda kogu tarkvara arendusperioodi ja tarkvara 
eluea jooksul. Uuringute andmetel tegeletakse tarkvara turvaküsimustega alles tarkvara 
arenduse ja hooldus etappidel. Kuna turvariskide vähendamine kaasneb tavaliselt muuda-
tustena informatsioonisüsteemi spetsifikatsioonis, on turvaanalüüsi mõistlikum teha tark-
vara väljatöötamise algusjärgus. See võimaldab varakult välistada ebasobivad lahendused. 
Lisaks aitab see vältida hilisemaid kulukaid muudatusi tarkvara arhitektuuris. 
Käesolevas töös käsitleme turvalise tarkvara arendamise probleemi, pakkudes lahendusena 
välja turvariskidele orienteeritud mustreid. Need mustrid aitavad leida turvariske äriprotses-
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sides ja pakuvad välja turvariske vähendavaid lahendusi. Turvamustrid pakuvad analüüti-
kutele vahendit turvanõuete koostamiseks äriprotsessidele. Samuti vähendavad mustrid ris-
kianalüüsiks vajalikku töömahtu. Oma töös joondame me turvariskidele orienteeritud must-
rid vastu hajussüsteemide turvaohtude mustreid. See võimaldab meil täiustada olemasole-
vaid turvariski mustreid ja võtta kasutusele täiendavaid mustreid turvariskide vähendami-
seks hajussüsteemides. 
Turvariskidele orienteeritud mustrite kasutatavust on kontrollitud lennunduse äriprotsessi-
des. Tulemused näitavad, et turvariskidele orienteeritud mustreid saab kasutada turvariskide 
vähendamiseks hajussüsteemides. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Tarkvara turvariskide haldamine, turvamustrid, turvanõuete koostamine 
CERCS:  
T120 Süsteemitehnoloogia, arvutitehnoloogia 
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1 Introduction 
“Security stands for the ability to protect information and information systems from unau-
thorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction” (Andress, 2011). 
It is one of the most important software qualities. Given that majority of modern organiza-
tions rely heavily on information systems, security plays a big part in ensuring smooth op-
eration of business processes. Many people rely on e-services offered by banks and medical 
establishments. For instance, in Estonia almost all medical prescriptions are handled through 
the e-Prescription system. Inadequate security measures in information systems could have 
unwanted effects on an organization’s reputation and on people’s lives. 
Security concerns usually need to be addressed throughout the development and lifetime of 
a software system. Literature reports however, that security is often considered during im-
plementation and maintenance stages of software development (Jürjens, 2005). Since secu-
rity risk mitigation usually results with changes to an IS’s specification, security analysis is 
best done at an early phase of the development process. This allows an early exclusion of 
inadequate system designs. Additionally, it helps prevent the need for fundamental and ex-
pensive design changes later in the development process. 
“A pattern is a solution to a problem that arises within a specific context” (Buschmann et 
al., 2007). Patterns first gained recognition in the software development community after 
the Gang-of-Four issued a book on design patterns (Gamma et al., 1994). In this thesis we 
target the secure system development problem by suggesting application of the security risk-
oriented patterns (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013). These patterns help find security risk oc-
currences in business processes and present mitigations for these security risks. They pro-
vide business analysts with means to elicit and introduce security requirements to business 
processes. More specifically we consider how security risk-oriented patterns could be used 
in distributed systems, such as an aviation turnaround system (Nõukas, 2015). We confront 
the security risk-oriented patterns against threat patterns for distributed systems (Uzunov & 
Fernandez, 2013). This allows us to refine the collection of existing patterns and introduce 
additional patterns to mitigate security risks in the processes of distributed systems.  
The main research question of the thesis is the following: 
RQ: How can the library of security risk-oriented patterns be expanded to support devel-
opment of secure distributed systems? 
This question is refined into three sub-questions: 
RQ1: Which security threats do the security risk-oriented patterns correspond to? 
To answer this question we consult the security threats library by Uzunov & Fernandez 
(2013) and align the security risk-oriented patterns to the security threats.  
RQ2: Which additional security risks and countermeasures should be considered to be 
able to apply security risk-oriented patterns for securing business processes in distributed 
systems? 
Threat patterns that do not align with the security risk-oriented patterns are potential candi-
dates for new security risk-oriented patterns. We examine each unaligned threat pattern to 
determine if it could pose a risk on a business process level. 
RQ3: What is the applicability of the security risk-oriented patterns in distributed sys-
tems? 
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To answer this question, we apply the security risk-oriented patterns to business processes 
from the aviation industry. After this we submit the resulting business processes enhanced 
with security requirements for expert review.  
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background of security require-
ments engineering and gives an overview of several commonly used security engineering 
methodologies. Additionally, the chapter covers and compares common modelling lan-
guages used for security risk management. Chapter 3 provides the background for security 
risk-oriented patterns. The current state of the security risk-oriented patterns library is ex-
amined in more detail and proposals are given on how it could be improved. Chapter 4 is 
devoted to the contribution of the thesis. In this chapter, changes to the security risk-oriented 
patterns library are proposed. Chapter 5 covers the validation of the improvements proposed 
in chapter 4. In the concluding chapter 6 suggestions for future work and closing remarks 
are provided. 
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2 Security Requirements Engineering 
In this chapter we define security engineering and security risk management activities. We 
introduce three prevalent security engineering approaches and cover some commonly used 
modelling languages for security risk management. We also examine the ISSRM domain 
model and explain how it assists us in addressing security risks. 
2.1 Security Engineering 
“Security engineering is an engineering discipline within systems engineering concerned 
with lowering the risk of intentional unauthorized harm to valuable assets to a level that is 
acceptable to the system’s stakeholders by preventing, detecting and reacting to malicious 
harm, misuse (i.e., attacks and incidents), threats and security risks” (Firesmith, 2007). 
Software development organizations ordinarily use some development process for software 
construction. Unfortunately, these development processes provide little or no support for 
security engineering. There are three high-profile approaches however, for introducing se-
curity concerns into the software development lifecycle. These are the Seven Touchpoints 
for Software Security (McGraw, 2006), Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle (How-
ard & Lipner, 2006) and OWASP CLASP (Secure Software, Inc., 2005). In the following 
subchapter we shall give a brief overview of all three methodologies. 
2.1.1 Security Engineering Approaches 
Seven Touchpoints for Software Security. Security engineering concerns artefacts from 
all stages of a software development process. Introducing security engineering into software 
development requires changes to the way software is built. However, making fundamental 
changes to an existing and proved development process is not something any software de-
velopment organization would likely wish to do. The Seven Touchpoints methodology of-
fers a solution to this problem by integrating security best practices to an existing develop-
ment process. 
 
Figure 1. Seven Touchpoints: Security best practices applied to respective software artefacts, adapted 
from (McGraw, 2006) 
Figure 1 depicts the six most common software development artefacts (i.e., requirements 
and use cases, architecture and design, test plans, code, tests and test results, and field feed-
back) together with respective touchpoints (i.e., security best practices). Although the figure 
resembles the waterfall process model, the Seven Touchpoints methodology is process in-
dependent, meaning it can be applied to any development process being used for software 
engineering (McGraw, 2006). We shall now examine each touchpoint in greater detail. 
Code review is an essential best practice for creating secure software, especially since code 
is the one artefact that is present in all software products. The purpose of code review is to 
find implementation bugs. However, code review alone is not sufficient for creating secure 
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software, since security problems can be also caused by design flaws. Therefore, it is im-
portant to perform architectural risk analysis.  
 
Figure 2. Security engineering approach, adapted from (Schumacher, 2003) 
Architectural risk analysis is a risk management process for finding flaws in the software 
architecture and design. Figure 2 depicts the general course of architectural risk analysis. It 
begins with elicitation of all the assets that are to be protected. The next step is identification 
of threats and attacks that could fall upon the assets. Risk estimation is performed on all the 
identified threats and attacks, including estimations of potential losses if a specific attack 
were to be successful. Elimination of all risks is almost always unreasonable due to cost and 
time consumption. Therefore, risks are prioritized in the order of severity. Mitigations to 
risks are considered in the form of countermeasures. Since the countermeasures can poten-
tially introduce new flaws, the process is repeated until a state of acceptable risk is achieved. 
Penetration testing is a type of black box testing that is performed with the system in its real 
environment (McGraw, 2003). Passing a penetration test does not reveal much about the 
security of the software. However, failing a penetration test is a clear indication of severe 
defects in the software.  
Risk-based security tests are performed using common attack patterns, risk analysis and 
abuse cases (McGraw, 2003). Knowledge of the system’s architecture is needed. 
Abuse cases describe how a software system behaves under an attack. They must be worked 
into the requirements artefact along with security requirements. Security requirements 
should cover both functional security and emergent characteristics. 
Security operations can be applied to a system that has already been fielded. The fielded 
system is monitored for attacks. If a successful attack is made, software behaviour is studied 
and changed in order for similar attacks not to be successful in future. 
Although not a separate touchpoint, external review is a practice recommended alongside 
the Seven Touchpoints. The reasoning behind it is that people are less likely to find faults 
in their own work and more likely to find them in others’ work (McGraw, 2003). 
Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle. Much like the Seven Touchpoints, Mi-
crosoft’s Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) can be integrated with an existing software 
development process in order to create secure software. The SDL process consists of seven 
phases, as depicted on Figure 3. These phases are as follows: training, requirements, design, 
implementation, verification, release and response. We shall examine each phase in more 
detail. 
Microsoft believes education and awareness to be fundamental cornerstones for building 
secure software and while young software engineers coming from universities and colleges 
understand security features, they do not know how to build secure software (Howard & 
Lipner, 2006). At minimum, software developers should be familiar with best practices of 
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secure software design, threat modelling, secure coding, security testing and privacy. Ac-
cording to SDL, attending at least one security training per year should be mandatory. Train-
ings should constantly be updated to address newest threats, research and mitigations.  
 
Figure 3. Security Development Lifecycle phases, adapted from (Howard & Lipner, 2006) 
Requirements phase is concerned with establishment of security requirements and bug bars 
as well as assessment of security and privacy risks. Security and privacy risk assessments 
determine the parts of the software that require deep security review. For privacy risk as-
sessment, the sensitivity of different data processed in the software is assessed to determine 
the Privacy Impact Rating. The Privacy Impact Rating represents the amount of work that 
is required to comply with the privacy requirements. In addition the project’s bug bar is 
defined which sets the minimum level of security quality for the software to be built. The 
bug bar determines the types of bugs that shall be fixed and the types that shall remain as is. 
Design phase consists of establishment of design requirements, analysation of attack surface 
and threat modelling. During this phase security and privacy design specifications are cre-
ated and reviewed. Secure design best practices are applied, the most important being re-
duction of the attack surface. The attack surface is defined as the union of code, interfaces, 
services and protocols available to all users (Howard & Lipner, 2006). In addition, threat 
modelling is performed to identify potential security threats and to provide appropriate mit-
igations. 
Implementation phase focuses on code quality. Static analysis of source code should be ap-
plied during this phase. Use of deprecated functions is strongly discouraged. Any external 
APIs that are deemed unsafe should be banned and replaced with safer alternatives. It is a 
good practice to define a list of approved tools to be used in the project. Using newest com-
pilers and code scanning tools is strongly recommended wherever possible. 
Verification phase ensures that the code meets the established requirements. This requires 
thorough testing of the software using fuzz testing, penetration testing, run-time verification, 
re-reviewing the threat models and re-evaluating the attack surface. The software must meet 
the security bar set during the requirements phase.  
Release phase prepares the software for public release. During this phase an incident re-
sponse plan is created. The plan prescribes the response process for when new threats 
emerge. SDL also foresees a Final Security Review (FSR) during this phase. FSR is an 
inspection of all the security activities performed prior to the release of the software. If the 
security team agrees that the FSR is successful, the product can be released. 
Response phase executes the response plan conducted during the release phase whenever 
security vulnerability reports emerge. Having a response plan enables the development team 
to execute their response in a swift manner, without wasting time on making decisions or 
fearing about overlooking something. Most importantly, it helps protect the customers from 
the newest threats.  
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OWASP CLASP. CLASP (Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process) is 
a role-based set of security best practices, which likewise the Seven Touchpoints and SDL 
can be integrated into an existing software development process. The core of CLASP are 24 
security related activities which are assigned to specific roles in a software organization. We 
discuss the practices proposed by CLASP in more detail below. 
Instituting awareness programs is a good way to educate people in a software organization 
about essential security concepts and techniques. Besides security training, establishing ac-
countability for security issues is also necessary to raise security awareness. It also helps to 
promote a better outcome from subsequent security practices. 
Performing application assessments helps in finding design, specification or implementa-
tion errors, thus reducing the number of security problems that make it into the software 
being built. Activities belonging to this practice include implementation and performing of 
security tests, threat modelling, source-level security review, and assessment of technology 
solutions’ security posture. 
Capturing security requirements should be an explicit part of development effort if security 
is of any importance at all in a software project. Activities within this practice include iden-
tification of attack surface, misuse cases, trust boundaries, and user roles’ resource capabil-
ities. 
Implementing secure development practices should become a part of an organization’s de-
velopment culture. This CLASP best practice introduces activities that guide developers 
through applying security principles to design, implementing security functionality into the 
project’s specification, as well as implementing and elaborating resource policies and secu-
rity technologies. 
Building vulnerability remediation procedures allows software engineers to effectively ad-
dress security vulnerabilities that are discovered during the lifetime of the project. The re-
mediation procedures should describe how vulnerabilities are assessed and prioritized, as 
well as how fixes are validated and delivered to the end-users.  
Defining and monitoring metrics allows the development team to assess the security posture 
of the software being built. Metrics help determine the effectiveness of security measures 
and investments. They are also practical for pinpointing any inadequacies in the develop-
ment process. 
Publishing operational security guidelines enables the future maintainers of the system to 
make the most of the security measures implemented in the software. Providing good doc-
umentation on recommended operational security measures requires little effort, but can 
help secure the product more effectively. 
Comparison of the Security Engineering Development Approaches 
The three aforementioned processes address security engineering in different manners. In-
depth analysis has been performed by (Buyens et al., 2007) where activities from each pro-
cess were gathered and inserted into a single matrix. Table 1 depicts an adapted version of 
this activity matrix. The activities gathered from the development processes have been di-
vided into nine regular development phases. Numbers in brackets following names of the 
development phases represent the total number of activities in the specific phase. While we 
cannot measure efficiency based on the activity matrix, we can see by comparing the num-
bers of activities from each process that CLASP and SDL are more heavyweight than 
Touchpoints. One of the main reasons for Touchpoints being notably less strict than the 
others is that it does not prescribe any activities for detailed design and support phases. 
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Although we might expect better security from the more rigorous processes, choosing the 
most optimal process really depends on the organization’s needs and available resources. 
The Seven Touchpoints are more affordable and suitable for smaller organizations while 
larger organizations might consider applying Microsoft’s SDL. Whichever process is cho-
sen, all three processes have gone through validation and have proved to be effective for 
increasing software security (Buyens et al., 2007). 
Table 1. Activity Matrix, adapted from (Buyens et al., 2007) 
Development phase SDL CLASP Touchpoints 
Education and awareness (7) 5 3 1 
Project inception (14) 6 8 4 
Analysis and requirements (31) 1 17 14 
Architectural design (24) 11 16 5 
Detailed design (14) 6 8 0 
Implementation (23) 8 18 1 
Testing (23) 8 8 10 
Release and deployment (6) 2 3 1 
Support (13) 12 5 0 
Total (155) 59 86 36 
2.1.2 Security Risk Management 
“Software risk management is a discipline whose objectives are to identify, address and 
eliminate software risk items before they become threats to successful software operation 
or major sources of expensive software rework” (Boehm, 1989). 
Risk management is a broad term and it can address different types of risks. In this thesis 
the focus is essentially on security risks. Since resources are always limited, mitigating soft-
ware security risks in a cost-effective manner can be a challenge. Software development 
organizations would benefit from eliminating or lowering risks in areas most essential to 
their business strategies in order to get most out of their investments. This can be done by 
comparing the cost of losses in case of a potential security breach to the cost of mitigating 
the enabling security risk. 
Applying countermeasures to security risks reflects in an IS’s specification. Postponing se-
curity risk management to latter parts of a software development process results in changes 
to the existing IS’s specification, thus making the development more expensive and time-
consuming. Therefore it is sensible to address security concerns during initial phases of the 
development process in order to discard inadequate design solutions as early as possible.  
There are hundreds of risk management methodologies and multiple security modelling 
frameworks available for security risk management. Some prevalent examples are CORAS 
(Braber et al., 2007), EBIOS (DCSSI, 2004), CRAMM (Insight Consulting, 2003) and OC-
TAVE (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001). These methodologies provide general guidelines for 
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identifying vulnerable assets, determining security objectives, assessing risks as well as de-
fining and implementing security requirements for treating security risks (Dubois et al., 
2010).  
Risk management methods can at large be divided into two: qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Qualitative methods use classifications to rate a potential impact of a threat as 
high, medium or low. Quantitative methods on the other hand use two inputs: probability of 
an event occurring and the cost of potential losses (Behnia et al., 2012). The product of these 
numbers is called Expected Annual Loss. 
CORAS is a model-based qualitative security risk analysis method which comes with its 
own language and supporting tool for modelling risks. The method is based on academic 
research, empirical studies, thorough experience, as well as close interaction and coopera-
tion with actors from industrial domain (Lund et al., 2011). 
EBIOS (Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité) is a qualitative 
approach which was initially intended for governmental organizations. It is composed of 
five steps which are context study, expression of sensitivities, risk study, security objectives 
identification and security requirements determination (DCSSI, 2004). 
CRAMM (CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method) is a qualitative approach that 
consists of three stages: establishing security objectives, assessing risks and identification 
of countermeasures (Insight Consulting, 2003). 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) is another 
qualitative approach for managing security risks. OCTAVE is focused on strategic and prac-
tice-related issues rather than technology. The primary target of OCTAVE are larger organ-
izations with over 200 employees (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001). 
Domain Model for Security Risk Management 
The ISSRM (Information System Security Risk Management) domain model is based on 
analysis of security and risk management standards, methods and frameworks (Dubois et 
al., 2010). It presents key concepts and their relationships used to define a security risk-
based template (see Figure 4). These concepts are asset-related, risk-related and risk treat-
ment-related. 
 
Figure 4. ISSRM Domain Model, adapted from (Dubois et al., 2010) 
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Asset-related concepts represent assets of an organization and their security criteria. Assets 
are divided into business assets (e.g., information about processes, confidential data, and 
skills) and information system assets, i.e., the infrastructure supporting the business assets. 
Security criteria describe the security needs of the business assets, i.e., availability, confi-
dentiality and integrity requirements. 
Risk-related concepts describe the underlying relations between the concepts that form a 
risk. A risk is composed of an event that leads to one or more negative impacts. An impact 
negates one or more security criterion and as a result harms the assets. An event is a conse-
quence of a threat exploiting a vulnerability in the system. A threat is a potential attack, 
carried out by a threat agent using an attack method. 
Risk-treatment related concepts describe the relations between decisions, requirements and 
controls for treating risks. A risk treatment represents a decision how to treat a risk (e.g., by 
avoiding, reducing, transferring or retaining the risk). A security requirement is a refinement 
of a risk treatment that mitigates a risk. A control represents the means to implement a se-
curity requirement. 
2.2 Modelling Languages for Security Risk Management 
There are numerous modelling languages available for modelling security requirements. 
Some commonly used examples are Misuse Cases (Sindre & Opdahl, 2005), Mal-Activity 
Diagrams (Sindre, 2007), Secure Tropos (Mouratidis & Giorgini, 2007) and Business Pro-
cess Model and Notation (Dijkman et al., 2007; Silver, 2009). In this chapter we give a brief 
overview of the languages and explain why we chose BPMN for presenting our contribu-
tions in this thesis. 
2.2.1 Business Process Model and Notation 
Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) is a widely used modelling language for 
graphical representation of business processes. Versatility is one of the reasons behind its 
popularity in academia as well as industry. It is applicable for analytical, executable, as well 
as descriptive modelling (Matulevičius, 2012). 
However, BPMN lacks possibilities for addressing security concerns when analysing busi-
ness needs. Extensions for BPMN proposed by (Altuhhova et al., 2013) help conform 
BPMN for security risk management purposes. These extensions are based on alignment of 
BPMN to the ISSRM domain model. The resulting security risk-aware BPMN allows ana-
lysts to introduce security requirements into business processes modelled in BPMN. This is 
good, because business processes and their security concerns can be addressed at the same 
time. 
Security risk-aware BPMN uses different colours for representing ISSRM concepts. Black 
is used for asset-related constructs, red is used for risk-related constructs and blue is used 
for risk-treatment related constructs. Table 2 highlights the main constructs that are used in 
the BPMN models in this thesis. 
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Table 2. Security Risk-aware BPMN Syntax, adapted from (Altuhhova et al., 2013) 
Asset-related Concepts 
ISSRM Concept BPMN Constructs Syntax 
Business asset Data object 
Task 
   
IS asset Data store 
Task 
Pool and lanes    
 
Security objective Property of a lock with a value from the 
CIA triad: 
c – confidentiality 
i – integrity 
a - availability 
     
Constraint Lock describes the security constraints of 
a business asset (depicted as a data ob-
ject or a task) 
   
Risk-related Concepts 
Impact An unlock associated with a business as-
set describes an impact of an event 
   
Vulnerability Annotation 
 
IS characteristic Vulnerability is a characteristic of an IS 
asset (represented using a Task) 
   
Risk Combination of flow objects (i.e., tasks, 
gateways, events), sequence flows, data 
flows, vulnerabilities, IS characteristics, 
and impacts 
 
Risk-treatment Related Concepts 
Security requirements Combination of flow objects connected by 
sequence flows 
 
Figure 5 depicts an example of a security risk-aware BPMN model. In this example a user 
inserts and submits data through an input interface. The padlock on the data object in the 
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input interface pool denotes that this data is confidential and should not be made readable 
for anyone else but the intended receiver. Therefore, a security requirement has been intro-
duced that requests the data to be made unreadable for third parties before it is sent on its 
way. The server receives the data and employs it. The data object with a padlock in the 
server pool denotes, that the data confidentiality criteria has been accomplished. 
 
Figure 5. An Example of Security Risk-aware BPMN 
The primary reason for choosing BPMN for presenting our contributions is that the existing 
body of work uses BPMN (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013). Thus for consistency purposes 
it makes sense to continue the expansion of the existing work using the established approach.  
2.2.2 Alternative Modelling Languages for Security Risk Management 
Mal-Activity Diagrams (MAD) are an extension of the Unified Modelling Language (UML) 
activity diagrams. Their main objective is to describe business processes, workflows and 
procedural logic (Chowdhury et al., 2012). The common workflow for designing a Mal-
Activity Diagram begins with creating a regular activity diagram and adding malicious ac-
tivities, swim lanes and decisions to it. A limitation of MAD is an inability to depict security 
concepts like vulnerabilities, events, risks and also security criteria. 
Misuse cases are extensions of use cases for supporting security requirements (Soomro & 
Ahmed, 2012). While use cases depict desirable functionalities in the IS, misuse cases depict 
functionalities that the system should not allow. A mis-actor is an initiator of misuse cases. 
Thus it is an actor whom the system should not support. Mis-actors and misuse cases are 
depicted in inverted colours in misuse case diagrams, as opposed to actors and use cases. 
Misuse case diagrams also support additional relations such as “detects” and “prevents” for 
indicating measures that detect and prevent unwanted activities. However, misuse cases are 
unable to distinguish between some ISSRM concepts such as IS assets, business assets and 
security requirements (Matulevičius et al., 2008). Another limitation of misuse cases is lack 
of modelling constructs for concepts like security criteria, risk and impact. 
Secure Tropos is an extension of Tropos and i* to provide support for security requirements 
modelling. It extends the two languages’ concepts and processes while integrating tech-
niques like security reference diagrams and security attack scenarios. It can be applied for 
early and late requirements engineering and architectural and detailed design (Matulevičius, 
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2012). Secure Tropos addresses security requirements simultaneously with other IS require-
ments. Additionally, social aspects of security are addressed at an early stage. Secure Tropos 
applies multiple models for security analysis. There is the security enhanced actor model 
(SEAM) which is intended for identification and analysis of IS actors and dependencies 
between them. The model describes security constraints that the actors must respect. For 
example, in case of a secure dependency constraint, a dependee must respect the security 
constraints expected by a depender. In addition to SEAM, there is also the security enhanced 
goal model (SEGM), which describes the reasoning behind each actor’s goals, plans and 
resources. Finally, there is the security reference diagram that is intended for identification 
of goals behind possible attacks. 
2.2.3 Comparison of Modelling Languages for ISSRM 
In a study performed by (Matulevičius, 2012), all of the four aforementioned modelling 
languages’ semiotic clarities for presenting ISSRM concepts were analysed. Table 3 sum-
marises the semiotic clarities of each language. 
There are only a few one-to-one correspondences between ISSRM concepts and language 
semantics. All languages have overloaded semantics for describing assets, meaning the lan-
guage constructs used for describing assets have multiple meanings. All languages also have 
redundancies which means that there are overlapping semantics between two or more lan-
guage constructs. Incompleteness is another issue in all of the modelling languages, meaning 
it is not possible to convey sufficient information about some ISSRM concepts. All of the 
languages also suffer from under-definition, meaning there are no dedicated semantics for 
presenting some ISSRM concepts. 
As we can see, none of the languages completely correspond to the ISSRM domain model. 
This is understandable however, because none of the languages were designed specifically 
for security risk management in the first place. 
Table 3. Semiotic Clarity of Modelling Languages, adapted from (Matulevičius, 2012) 
Semiotic clarity BPMN Secure Tropos Misuse cases Mal-activity dia-
grams 
One-to-one corre-
spondence 
Threat agent Threat agent Security criterion, 
impact, vulnerabil-
ity, threat agent 
Impact, threat 
agent, control 
Redundancy Assets Event Assets Assets, attack 
method 
Overload Assets Assets Assets Assets 
Incompleteness Security criterion, 
risk, impact, event, 
vulnerability, threat, 
risk treatment, con-
trol 
Risk, impact, vul-
nerability, threat, 
risk treatment, con-
trol 
Risk, event, threat, 
risk treatment, con-
trol 
Security criterion, 
risk, event, vul-
nerability, threat, 
risk treatment 
Under-definition Assets, attack 
method, security re-
quirements 
Assets, security cri-
terion, attack 
method, security re-
quirements 
Assets, attack 
method, security 
requirements 
Assets, security 
requirements 
2.3 Security Requirements Engineering Using Patterns 
In this chapter we examine the security requirements engineering methodology that enables 
us to elicit security requirements using patterns. We also give descriptions of some alterna-
tive popular security requirements engineering approaches. 
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2.3.1 Security Requirements Elicitation from Business Processes (SREBP) 
SREBP is a security requirements elicitation method developed at University of Tartu (Ah-
med, 2014). It is based on the ISSRM domain model and security risk-oriented patterns 
(Ahmed, 2014). The method is composed of two sequential stages (see Figure 6). During 
the first stage business assets are identified using value chains and business process models 
as an input. Security objectives are then determined for each asset. 
 
Figure 6. Security Requirement Elicitation from Business Processes (SREBP), adapted from (Ahmed, 
2014) 
At the second stage, security requirements are elicited using operational business processes. 
During this stage, the information system is approached at five contextual areas: access con-
trol, communication channel, input interfaces, network infrastructure, and data store. Ap-
propriate security risk-oriented patterns are then selected that mitigate relevant security risks 
in each of the contextual areas. We give a short overview of the five contextual areas below. 
Access control contextual area addresses concerns related to access control policy to ensure 
the integrity and confidentiality of business assets (e.g., data). A proposed security risk mit-
igation method could be the implementation of a Role-based Access Control (RBAC) 
model. Permissions are granted based on existing job functions (i.e. roles) in the organiza-
tion. 
Communication channel is concerned with data exchange between business entities. The 
focus is on confidentiality and integrity of the data being transferred using a transmission 
medium.  
Input interfaces covers the treatment of input data prior to processing it. This includes 
checks for compatibility (e.g., data format), completeness (e.g., fulfilment of mandatory 
fields) and logical errors (e.g., correctness of dates).  
Network infrastructure is focused on the protection of network infrastructures used between 
different business entities to perform business operations. The goal is to ensure the availa-
bility of business operations derived from the operational business process models. 
Data store contextual area is concerned with the protection of data during storage and re-
trieval operations in associated databases. 
There are relevant security risk-oriented patterns that correspond to each contextual area. 
The patterns address potential risks and provide security requirements together with reason-
ing behind them. We discuss security risk-oriented patterns in more detail in chapters 3 and 
4. 
2.3.2 Alternative Security Requirements Engineering Approaches 
There are numerous alternative methodologies available for security requirements engineer-
ing. Some popular examples are Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE, 
Mead et al., 2005), and Security Requirements Engineering Process (SREP, Mellado et al., 
2007). We give brief overviews of these methodologies below. 
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SQUARE. SQUARE is a security requirements elicitation, categorisation and prioritisation 
method originally developed at Carnegie Mellon University (Mead et al., 2005). One of the 
main goals of the SQUARE methodology is to integrate security engineering into early 
stages of the software development process. The method consists of nine steps. We give 
brief overviews of each of the steps below. 
Agreement on definitions. SQUARE is dependent on the participation of requirements en-
gineers with security expertise and also representatives from the stakeholders. An agreement 
is formed on the security definitions used throughout the process. Definitions do not usually 
need to be invented, but can be obtained from sources such as IEEE (Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers).  
Identification of assets and security goals. Once the requirements team and stakeholders 
have agreed on the definitions, work can begin on the identification of assets and security 
goals. A wide representative selection of stakeholders should be engaged to elicit all the 
various goals that different stakeholders have. After the assets and security goals have been 
identified, they also need to be prioritized based on their significance in the organization’s 
business activity.  
Development of artefacts to support security requirements definition. Artefacts in the form 
of threat scenarios, misuse or abuse cases, etc. are developed. This is to ensure that the 
organization as a whole has the same understanding of the inputs for requirements elicitation 
and to keep any assumptions at a minimum. These artefacts also serve as the input for risk 
assessment.  
Performance of risk assessment. With the help of a risk expert, an appropriate risk assess-
ment method is selected for the project. Risk assessment provides an overview of the se-
vereness of different security exposures.  
Selection of elicitation techniques. The team chooses an elicitation technique that would be 
most effective for gathering the particular stakeholders’ security requirements needs. After 
this, the actual security requirements elicitation can start.  
Elicitation of security requirements. Using the artefacts developed earlier, initial require-
ments are developed.  
Categorization of security requirements. The requirements are categorized to determine 
whether they are essential requirements, goals or architectural constraints. Categorized re-
quirements also serve as the input for the requirements prioritization step.  
Prioritization of requirements. SQUARE does not specify a prioritization technique. The 
technique should be selected based on the specific project’s characteristics.  Consequences 
of a security breach can be considered for prioritization as well as the cost/benefit ratio of 
satisfying different requirements.  
Inspection of requirements. As a final step, the prioritized list of requirements are inspected 
using methods such as Fagan or peer reviews. The final output is a documentation of security 
requirements that fulfils the security goals of the project. 
SREP. SREP is an asset-based and risk-driven security requirements engineering method 
that integrates Common Criteria (CC) into iterative and incremental software development 
models (Mellado et al., 2007). SREP makes use of a Security Resources Repository (SRR) 
to enable reuse of security requirements, assets, threats and countermeasures in future de-
velopment iterations. The core of SREP consists of nine activities which should be carried 
out in each development iteration throughout the incremental development process. The ac-
tivities are the following: 
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Agree on definitions. During this activity the organization determines the stakeholders and 
forms an agreement on the security definitions, organizational security policies and the se-
curity vision of the IS. The security definitions are preferably taken from the ISO/IEC and 
IEEE standards. All of this shall be documented in the Security Vision Document. 
Identify vulnerable and/or critical assets. The goal of this activity is to have a collective 
understanding of the assets that are important to the system. The assets are determined for 
example by analysing functional requirements or interviewing the stakeholders, but also by 
surveying the Security Resources Repository (SRR). 
Identify security objectives and dependencies. Security objectives are established for each 
of the assets identified during the previous activity. SRR can also be consulted for this, 
provided it contains the assets identified in the previous activity with their associated secu-
rity objectives. Otherwise the objectives are established taking into account the previously 
agreed upon security policy as well as legal requirements and constraints. Following this, 
dependencies are established between the security objectives. As a final output of this ac-
tivity, the objectives and dependencies are documented in the Security Objectives Docu-
ment. 
Identify threats and develop artefacts. The goal of this activity is to identify all of the threats 
that compromise the identified assets. If threats are not already available in the SRR, arte-
facts such as misuse cases, attack tree diagrams etc. are developed. Also, public domain 
sources should be searched to identify potential vulnerabilities in the IS. As a result, the 
Security Problem Definition Document is generated which contains the identified threats, 
assumptions and conformance claims. 
Risk assessment. This activity takes the previously compiled threat list as an input. For each 
threat, its probability, potential impact and risk are determined. The results are captured in 
the Risk Assessment Document. 
Elicit security requirements. Suitable security requirements are elicited that mitigate the 
threats sufficiently based on the risk assessment results. The Security Requirements Speci-
fication Document is created as a result of this activity. 
Categorize and prioritize requirements. Requirements are categorized and prioritized ac-
cording to their importance, i.e., the severeness of the risk they mitigate. 
Requirements inspection. The quality of the output from the previous activities is evaluated 
by reviewing all the previously generated artefacts (i.e. documents, models, requirements) 
and the results are presented in a Validation Report. Security requirements conformance to 
the IEEE 830-1998 standard is checked. 
Repository improvement involves extending the SRR with new elements such as assets, 
threats, and requirements etc. that were identified during the previous eight activities. This 
information can be reused in future iterations. As the project development matures, the qual-
ity of the requirements stored in SRR is likely to increase because any inconsistencies, mis-
takes or ambiguities are more likely to be discovered. 
2.4 Summary 
Chapter 2 presented security related concepts such as security engineering and security risk 
management. Several security engineering and security risk management methods were ex-
plored. Additionally, model driven approach for security risk management was studied in-
cluding modelling languages used for security risk management. The next chapter goes into 
more detail about security risk-oriented patterns and security patterns in general. 
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3 Security Patterns 
This chapter gives an overview of security patterns, categories of security patterns, and 
threat patterns. There exist numerous classification systems for categorizing security pat-
terns. In subchapter 3.1 we introduce one of the more commonly referenced classification 
systems by (Schumacher, 2003). We are also aware that there are numerous resources avail-
able for threat patterns (e.g., Mitre’s CAPEC, Microsoft’s STRIDE). However, in this thesis 
we would like to focus on the security threats taxonomy for distributed systems by (Uzunov 
& Fernandez, 2013). We discuss these threat patterns in subchapter 3.2. We also discuss the 
library of security risk-oriented patterns (SRPs) that SREBP is based on in subchapter 3.3. 
As a preparation for our contributions, we align the SRPs with the threat patterns by Uzunov 
& Fernandez (2013) to see which threat patterns the SRPs correspond to. 
3.1 What are Security Patterns? 
“A security pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that arises in a specific 
security context and presents a well-proven generic scheme for a security solution” (Schu-
macher, 2003). Although patterns can be used in other areas of software development, in 
this paper we specifically focus on security patterns. 
Software projects tend to run into similar problems. Often these problems do not require 
new tailor-made solutions, but can be solved with solutions that have already been success-
fully applied in previous situations. Novice software engineers however lack this practical 
experience to rely on. This is where patterns come in handy. Instead of spending time and 
resources on working out new solutions, software developers can opt to implement already 
proven solutions by applying the appropriate patterns.  
The objective of a pattern is to represent a high-quality and proven solution that solves a 
given problem optimally. A pattern does not aim to be new and innovative, but rather rely 
on a solution that has already been successfully applied in the past. In addition to that, a 
pattern ought to be as independent as possible from specific implementation technologies 
and tools. Not any solution to a problem qualifies as a pattern. In order for a solution to 
become a pattern it must first go through an organized peer review. Most patterns get their 
quality assurance at conferences like PLoP and EuroPLoP.  
Patterns are not independent islands. They are part of a hierarchy where larger patterns con-
tain smaller patterns that solve sub-problems of the main problem. Patterns can be combined 
together with other patterns and form a larger design. Because of this combinability, patterns 
can effectively be applied in complex and large-scale software systems. 
The pattern catalogue introduced by (Schumacher et al., 2005) divides patterns into classes. 
We give brief overviews of each of these classes below. 
Enterprise Security and Risk Management patterns include policies, directives and con-
straints that apply to all systems in an enterprise. They mitigate risks that weigh on all parts 
of the enterprise and help resolve the security needs of the enterprise’s assets. 
Identification and Authentication patterns describe specific requirements for how users 
identify and authenticate themselves in the system. The designs make use of security 
measures such as passwords, biometrics, hardware tokens etc. 
Access Control Model patterns concern authorization i.e. which resources are available to 
whom. This includes role-based access control where access is given based on daily tasks 
of users. They also address how access to sensitive data should be assigned. 
22 
 
System Access Control Architecture patterns are essential for systems that explicitly deny 
or permit the use of access control security services. The patterns deal with the architecture 
of the software system. 
Operating System Access Control patterns concern how access to files in an operating sys-
tem is controlled and how authorization is enforced on processes that wish to access a certain 
resource. 
Accounting patterns prescribe how events involving the assets are tracked. This involves 
intrusion detection mechanisms that analyse the captured events for indications of security 
violations. 
Firewall Architecture patterns are for controlling attacks on the network. They guide ana-
lysts to make a decision of trade-offs between complexity, speed and security. 
Secure Internet Applications patterns deal with obscuring data and information about the 
surrounding environment, securing message channels, interaction methods with known part-
ners and the location of the organization’s web servers. 
Cryptographic Key Management patterns are solely dedicated to secure communications. 
They prescribe cryptographic key generation and session and public key exchange methods. 
 
Figure 7. Sequence of Enterprise Security and Risk Management Patterns, adapted from (Schu-
macher et al., 2005) 
Figure 7 depicts the sequence of enterprise security and risk management patterns described 
by (Schumacher et al., 2005). The sequence closely follows the ISSRM domain model (see 
Figure 4) as we shall now see.  
Security needs identification for enterprise assets covers the security criterions class of the 
ISSRM domain model. It helps decide whether security is needed and if so, what the security 
criterions for the various enterprise assets are. 
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Asset valuation is closely related to IS asset and business asset classes in the ISSRM domain 
model. Valuation helps to determine the value of the enterprise’s assets based on the costs 
of compromise (e.g. hard costs like fees and soft costs like loss of market share) on assets. 
Threat assessment is connected to the threat class of ISSRM. Threats are about the likeli-
hood of an attack occurring. Threat assessment intends to examine which threats are more 
likely to compromise the enterprise’s assets and the likelihood of their occurrence. 
Vulnerability assessment is related to ISSRM’s vulnerability class. It addresses known 
weaknesses of the information system’s assets and the severity of each vulnerability if it 
were to be exploited by an attacker. 
Risk determination relates to event and risk classes of ISSRM and it guides us in assessing 
each risk’s significance based on asset valuation, threat assessment and vulnerability assess-
ment. The risks can be prioritized based on their significance levels. 
Enterprise security approaches represent ISSRM’s security requirement class which deter-
mines the prevention, detection and response techniques employed for protecting the enter-
prise’s assets from appropriate risks. 
Enterprise security services presents the services for protecting the enterprise’s assets based 
on the previously established security approaches. It is related to the control class of ISSRM. 
Examples of such requirements include authentication, identification, authorization etc. 
3.2 Threat Patterns for Distributed Systems 
Uzunov & Fernandez (2013) divide security threats to distributed systems into eight cate-
gories and meta-security threats to the security infrastructure of systems into four categories. 
The security threat categories are based on the nature of the threats. Table 4 contains the 
complete list of first level security threat patterns and Table 5 contains the list of second 
level (i.e., meta-security) threat patterns, divided by category. We describe each threat cat-
egory in more detail below. 
Identity attacks are attacks where an attacker fabricates a new identity or claims to own an 
existing identity in the system. This allows the attacker to gain special privileges in the 
system and access sensitive data. 
Network communication attacks target communications between different components of 
the system. There are many threat patterns in this class of attacks. An example threat pattern 
is message secrecy violation where an attacker intercepts the communications between end-
points and obtains the transmitted contents. Message integrity violation is an extension of 
the aforementioned threat in which the attacker actually manipulates with the data being 
transmitted, whether by corrupting, deleting or replacing it. 
Network protocol attacks are a special class of network communication attacks which spe-
cifically target the underlying protocols being used for message communication. This is 
another class with many threat patterns. One example of this class is protocol field modifi-
cation where an attacker modifies a field of the protocol causing unwanted behaviour in the 
communications process. Another example is protocol initial state exploitation where the 
attacker exploits the protocol initiation procedure, enabling the attacker to initiate more con-
nections than is allowed. 
Passing illegal data is a class with just one threat pattern which is data injection. As the 
name indicates, the attacker sends malicious data to a target which then processes it. Exam-
ples of injected data are SQL statements, binary code, OS commands etc., depending on the 
target context. 
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Stored data attacks are targeted towards on-storage data. A threat pattern belonging to this 
class is data corruption in which the attacker harms the stored data, potentially causing in-
stability in the target system. 
Remote information inference threats aim to gather information from the target component. 
This class of threats includes patterns like scanning of systems for useful information (e.g. 
software versions), probing of systems for known vulnerabilities and disclosure of system 
output (e.g. error messages) information. 
Loss of accountability threats deal with altering attributes concerning accountability. The 
threat patterns in this threat class are track erasing where the attacker manipulates with au-
diting information and repudiation where a user negates being the executor of some opera-
tion in the system. 
Uncontrolled operations is a class of threats aimed at exploiting system functionality. This 
is another class with many threat patterns. A threat pattern belonging to this class is unau-
thorized access where a user gains access to the system’s resources without authorization. 
Another pattern is resource exhaustion where the system’s resources are used excessively 
causing delays in system responsiveness. 
The four meta-security threat categories with their respective descriptions are as follows. 
Cryptography attacks are aimed at countermeasures which apply cryptography. One exam-
ple of a threat pattern in this class is abuse of a weak cryptography algorithm which might 
allow the attacker to read sensitive data. Another form of attacks are password attacks. The 
easiest targets are passwords passed in plaintext and password storages that do not apply 
salting of password hashes. 
Countermeasure design attacks try to exploit mistakes in the countermeasure setup. This 
class of attacks contains three patterns which are use of default credentials, bypassing con-
trols and leveraging authorization model. Use of default credentials is self-explanatory – the 
attacker uses default credentials of a software for authentication. Bypassing of controls is a 
potential threat in systems that have insecure access points. Leveraging of authorization 
models threats systems which fail to enforce authorization correctly.  
Configuration and administration attacks exploit configuration and administration weak 
points in a security infrastructure. Threat patterns belonging to this class are exploitation of 
bad policies and unauthorized modification of rights. Bad or missing policies might for ex-
ample give users more control in the system than is necessary. Unauthorized modification 
of rights is a threat that affects systems which allow administrators to modify policies which 
they should be allowed to. 
Network protocol attacks which we saw in the security threat categories also belong to the 
meta-security threats.   
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Table 4. First Level Security Threat Patterns, adapted from (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
First level (security) threat patterns 
1. Identity attacks UFP 1.1 Identity spoofing 
UFP 1.2 Advantageous identity allocation 
2. Network communications 
attacks 
UFP 2.1 Message secrecy violation (passive eavesdropping, reading 
plaintext message) 
UFP 2.2 Message integrity violation (active eavesdropping, modification) 
UFP 2.3 Message authenticity violation 
UFP 2.4 Traffic analysis, protocol sniffing 
UFP 2.5 Covert network channel 
UFP 2.6 Session hijacking 
UFP 2.7 Session state poisoning 
UFP 2.8 Route poisoning 
UFP 2.9 Message flooding 
3. Network protocol attacks UFP 3.1 Message replay 
UFP 3.2 Message reuse 
UFP 3.3 Protocol field modification 
UFP 3.4 Use of abnormal packet sizes 
UFP 3.5 Use of abnormal packet sequencing (reordering) 
UFP 3.6 Use of reserved protocol packets 
UFP 3.7 Protocol initial/end state exploitation 
4. Passing illegal data UFP 4.1 Injection 
5. Stored data attacks UFP 5.1 Corruption 
6. Remote information infer-
ence 
UFP 6.1 Scanning (information gathering) 
UFP 6.2 Probing (vulnerability checking) 
UFP 6.3 Output information disclosure 
UFP 6.4 Data inference 
7. Loss of accountability UFP 7.1 Track erasing 
UFP 7.2 Repudiation 
8. Uncontrolled operations UFP 8.1 Unauthorized access 
UFP 8.2 Invoking unauthorized operations 
UFP 8.3 Spoofing privileged processes (transitive actions) 
UFP 8.4 Unsafe code execution 
UFP 8.5 Exploitation of tight component coupling 
UFP 8.6 Process overflow attack (buffer/integer overflows) 
UFP 8.7 Exploiting concurrency flaws 
UFP 8.8 Resource exhaustion 
UFP 8.9 Targeted process crashing 
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Table 5. Second Level Security Threat Patterns, adapted from (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
Second level (meta-security) threat patterns 
9. Cryptography attacks UFP 9.1 Forging cryptographic credentials 
UFP 9.2 Abuse of weak algorithm 
UFP 9.3 Exploiting vulnerable security protocol 
UFP 9.4 Password attacks (guessing, brute force, rainbow tables, etc.) 
10. Countermeasure design UFP 10.1 Use of default credentials 
UFP 10.2 Bypassing controls 
UFP 10.3 Leveraging authorization model 
11. Configuration/administra-
tion 
UFP 11.1 Exploiting bad policies 
UFP 11.2 Unauthorized modification of rights (meta-authorization poli-
cies) 
3.3 Security Risk-oriented Patterns 
The library of security risk-oriented patterns compiled by (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) 
contains five patterns. The patterns give an overview of the secured assets, risks and risk 
treatment methods. By applying these patterns to business processes, business analysts can 
design secure business processes on their own. We shall give brief descriptions of the secu-
rity patterns below. 
Security risk-oriented pattern (SRP) 1 secures data from unauthorized access. The security 
criteria for this pattern is confidentiality of the data stored on a business server. There is a 
risk that a user might request sensitive data from the server with the intention of misusing 
it. As a risk reduction measure the pattern proposes checking of access rights during data 
retrieval requests. Sensitivity levels must therefore be assigned to data and trust levels as-
signed to people or devices accessing the data as a measure for clearance verification. 
SRP 2 ensures secure data transmission between business entities. Data confidentiality and 
integrity are two important security criteria for this pattern, because we do not wish to give 
access to the data to any third party and we wish that the data submitted by a client is the 
same data that is received by the server. However, data transmitted through a transmission 
medium faces at least two security vulnerabilities. A threat agent acting as a proxy could 
steal and read the data being transmitted. In addition, there is a risk of the transmitted data 
being modified during transmission. In order to reduce the risk of either of those attacks 
occurring, the pattern offers two security requirements. The data is encrypted in order to 
make the data unreadable to the threat agent and the data is also verified on the server to 
avoid the loss of data integrity. 
SRP 3 ensures secure business activity after data submission. The security criteria for this 
pattern are availability and integrity of the business activity. Malicious scripts (e.g. SQL or 
xPath injections) submitted through an input interface could lead to disruption of the busi-
ness activity, making the business activity unavailable and lose its integrity. What is more, 
execution of these malicious scripts on the server risks data confidentiality and integrity. To 
reduce the risk, the pattern proposes filtering of the incoming data which could be in the 
form of input validation, sanitisation, filtration and/or canonicalization. 
SRP 4 secures business services against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. The 
security criteria for this pattern is the availability of the business service. The risk is that 
there exists a threat agent with an access to many computers and the threat agent would 
exploit this access by making many simultaneous requests (e.g. TCP SYN or DNS flooding, 
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HTTP spidering etc.) at the target server, causing the business service to become unavailable 
for ordinary users. To reduce the risk of a successful DoS attack the pattern proposes a 
security requirement for checking for abnormal requests. Checking would involve filtering 
and classifying requests and detecting abnormalities with the requests. Requests classified 
as DoS attacks are discarded. 
SRP 5 secures storage of data and data retrieval from storage. The security criteria for this 
pattern is confidentiality of data at the storage. There exists a risk that data could leak hori-
zontally across the departments of an organization. A threat agent, in this case is a malicious 
insider with an access to the data could retrieve data from the storage. As a risk reduction 
measure the pattern proposes to make the data invisible using cryptographic or data protec-
tion techniques. 
In the next subchapter we illustrate how different security threat patterns and security risk-
oriented patterns are related to one another. 
3.4 Alignment of Security Risk-oriented Patterns and Security Threat 
Patterns 
Table 6 represents the alignment of security risk-oriented patterns to Uzunov & Fernandez’s 
security threat patterns (2013). We can see how each security risk-oriented pattern is related 
to at least one threat pattern. Only seven security threat patterns currently have respective 
SRPs. However, the library of security threat patterns for distributed systems contains over 
30 threat patterns. One of our goals in this thesis is to see which additional threat patterns 
should be mitigated by the SRPs. As another goal, we wish each SRP to address a single 
threat. Chapter 4 discusses these objectives in further detail and describes our efforts in 
working towards these goals. 
Table 6. Alignment of Security Risk-oriented Patterns and Uzunov and Fernandez's Security Threat 
Patterns 
Security Risk-oriented Pattern Uzunov & Fernandez’s Threat Pattern 
SRP1. Secure data from unauthorized access UFP 8.2 Invoking unauthorized operations 
SRP2. Secure data transmission between business 
entities 
UFP 2.1 Message secrecy violation 
UFP 2.2 Message integrity violation 
SRP3. Secure business activity after data submis-
sion 
UFP 4.1 Injection 
UFP 8.6 Process overflow attack 
SRP4. Secure business services against denial of 
service attacks 
UFP 2.9 Message flooding 
UFP 8.8 Resource exhaustion 
SRP5. Secure storage of data and data retrieval 
from storage 
UFP 5.1 Corruption 
UFP 7.1 Track erasing 
UFP 8.1 Unauthorized access 
3.5 Summary 
Chapter 3 was an introduction into the world of security patterns. We covered the definition, 
some important qualities of security patterns, and a classification system for security pat-
terns. The library of security risk-oriented patterns was examined alongside the library of 
threat patterns for distributed systems. Links were pointed out between the existing security 
risk-oriented patterns and threat patterns. This chapter concludes the background part of this 
thesis. 
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4 Contribution 
In this chapter we reclassify the security risk-oriented patterns (SRPs) based on the security 
threats they address in order to target individual security threats more intelligibly. Addition-
ally, we expand the library of SRPs with extra security patterns in order to address security 
threats that are currently not considered. We also list the security threat patterns that are 
unsuitable for securing business processes and explain why. After revising the library of 
SRPs, we categorize the security patterns according to the five contextual areas of SREBP. 
Throughout this chapter we use security risk-aware BPMN to model the SRPs. Additionally, 
we present the SRPs in tabular form in appendix II. The tables contain additional infor-
mation about the SRPs and explain in further depth how they correspond to the threat pat-
terns. 
4.1 Revision of Security Risk-oriented Patterns’ Classifications 
In chapter 3.4 we discussed the correspondence between SRPs and Uzunov & Fernandez’s 
security threat patterns (2013). As we learned, four of the five SRPs mitigate more than one 
security threat. Ideally, a SRP should address a single security threat. This enables business 
analysts to only mitigate risks that are relevant in a system and prevents creating security 
requirements that target non-existent risks. Additionally, it allows each SRP to describe the 
security objectives, risks and risk treatment methods more explicitly. Therefore, we propose 
dividing the existing SRPs based on the threats they address. Table 7 represents the result 
of this division. We examine each case in further detail below. 
Table 7. Division of SRPs Based on the Security Threats They Address 
Ahmed & Matulevičius’s SRPs Divided SRPs 
SRP1. Secure data from unauthorized access SRP1a. Secure data from unauthorized access 
SRP1b. Secure business service from unauthorized 
access 
SRP2. Secure data transmission between business 
entities 
SRP2a. Secure data from secrecy violation during 
transmission between business entities 
SRP2b. Secure data from integrity violation during 
transmission between business entities 
SRP3. Secure business activity after data submis-
sion 
SRP3a. Secure business activity from injection at-
tacks 
SRP3b. Secure business activity from buffer over-
flow attacks 
SRP4. Secure business services against denial of 
service attacks 
SRP4a. Secure business services against message 
flooding attacks 
SRP4b. Secure business services against resource 
exhaustion attacks 
SRP5. Secure storage of data and data retrieval 
from storage 
SRP5a. Secure data in data store from corruption 
by a malicious insider 
SRP5b. Secure the integrity of auditing information 
from a malicious insider 
SRP5c. Secure data in data store from unauthor-
ized access by a malicious insider 
SRP1 has been relabelled as SRP1a. It secures data from unauthorized access (see Table 
19). The threat pattern that conforms to SRP1 (UFP 8.2 Invoking unauthorized operations) 
does not explicitly state the impact of the attack. Therefore, we have created a separate pat-
tern labelled as SRP1b for securing business services from unauthorized access (see Table 
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20). The security requirements for SRP1b are the same as for SRP1a, which is to check the 
client’s authorization rights before granting access to the business service (see Figure 32). 
SRP2 has been divided into two separate patterns since it addresses two different threats 
during message transmission. The resulting SRP2a and SRP2b address threats to confiden-
tiality and integrity security criteria separately and propose respective mitigations (see Table 
21, Table 22). The security objectives, risks and requirements remain the same for both 
SRP2a (see Figure 33, Figure 34, Figure 35) and SRP2b (see Figure 36, Figure 37, Figure 
38).  
SRP3 has been relabelled as SRP3a (see Table 23). The security objectives (see Figure 39), 
risk (see Figure 40) and requirements (see Figure 41) remain the same. SRP3b is a new 
pattern that describes a special case of injection attacks where the attacker triggers a buffer 
overflow in the process execution environment (see Figure 43). This can result with control 
being passed to binary code injected by the attacker. The security objectives and require-
ments for both patterns are mostly the same with the only exception being that SRP2b rec-
ommends employing a whitelist of acceptable inputs as an additional security control wher-
ever applicable. In case of buffer overflow attacks, the IS’s security posture would also 
benefit from applying boundary checking (see Table 24). 
SRP4 has been relabelled as SRP4a. SRP4a still focuses on distributed denial of service 
attacks (see Table 25) while SRP4b focuses on resource exhaustion attacks that lead to de-
nial of service (see Table 26). Although the security objectives for both patterns are the same 
(i.e., availability of a business service), the risks and risk treatment methods are different. A 
resource exhaustion attack does not require a large volume of requests to be made at the 
target system like in case of distributed denial of service attacks. This attack rather relies on 
skilful manipulation of the target system. The best practice would be to eliminate any vul-
nerabilities (e.g., poor or lack of resource utilization restrictions) from the IS that could 
enable this attack in the first place. This can be achieved by implementing a throttling mech-
anism to limit the amount of resources available for allocation by a single user. A strong 
authentication and access control can also go a long way in order to mitigate this threat. 
SRP5 has been relabelled as SRP5c (see Table 29). There are two additional patterns that 
are closely related to the malicious insider threat. SRP5a mitigates the threat of data corrup-
tion by an insider (see Table 27). This threat can be difficult to mitigate. Fortunately, there 
exist methodologies that are able to detect this attack using checksums (Barbará et al., 2000). 
SRP5b is a special case of data integrity manipulation attack where the malicious insider 
attempts to modify or delete auditing information to erase tracks of malicious behaviour (see 
Table 28). Similarly to SRP5a, the security requirement is to implement a database integrity 
defence mechanism that can detect the attack. 
4.2 Additional Security Risk-oriented Patterns 
Table 8 presents a list of new security risk-oriented patterns that are based on Uzunov and 
Fernandez’s security threat patterns (2013). We give an overview of each pattern by exam-
ining the secured assets, potential risks and security requirements. 
SRP6 prevents leakage of confidential information (e.g., information about system config-
uration, credentials, private information) through error and standard response messages (see 
Table 30). Whenever an error condition emerges, it is usually desirable to return an explan-
atory output to the user in case there are any insufficiencies in the request made to the server. 
This scenario is illustrated in Figure 8. However, if these output messages are not properly 
filtered from confidential information, the attacker could employ this information to launch 
other attacks at the system, potentially causing unavailability of the business service as well 
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as loss of data integrity and confidentiality (see Figure 9). The security requirement for risk 
reduction is to filter confidential information from output messages. Figure 10 illustrates the 
introduction of the security requirement into a business process. The security requirement 
can be implemented by means such as generic error messages that do not leak information. 
Properly configuring server software so that debug messages are disabled in live environ-
ments should also be an obligatory task. 
Table 8. Additional Security Risk-oriented Patterns 
Security Risk-oriented Pattern Threat Pattern for Distributed Systems 
SRP6. Prevent harm to business service through 
leakage of information via error and standard re-
sponse messages 
UFP 6.3 Output information disclosure 
SRP7. Protect business services from deadlock at-
tacks 
UFP 8.9 Targeted process crashing 
SRP8a. Secure system from brute force password 
attacks 
UFP 9.4 Password attacks (guessing, brute force, 
rainbow tables, etc.) 
SRP8b. Secure system from unauthorized access 
through common or default usernames and pass-
words 
UFP 10.1 Use of default credentials 
SRP8c. Secure the system from account lockout at-
tacks 
Countermeasure design attack, no matching UFP 
 
Figure 8. SRP6: Business Process Model with annotated security objectives 
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Figure 9. SRP6: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 10. SRP6: Security Requirements for Business Process 
SRP7 protects business services from deadlock attacks (see Table 31). A deadlock is a con-
dition where multiple processes become dependent on one-another to finish and thus none 
of the processes ever finish. An attacker could skilfully trigger a deadlock condition and 
cause the business service to crash. Business availability is the security criterion in this pat-
tern, as illustrated in Figure 11. The vulnerability that makes this attack possible is absence 
of process synchronization (see Figure 12). The security requirement proposed by SRP7 is 
therefore to synchronize execution and operation of simultaneous processes (see Figure 13). 
This requirement could be achieved for example by implementing non-blocking synchroni-
zation algorithms. 
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Figure 11. SRP7: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 12. SRP7: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 13. SRP7: Security Requirements for Business Process 
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SRP8a secures the system against brute force password attacks (see Table 32). A brute force 
attack is a trial-and-error method of trying every key from a key space until a legitimate key 
is found. The key space can be infinite or finite (i.e., a dictionary). The security criteria for 
this pattern are availability of the business service as well as integrity and confidentiality of 
data (see Figure 14). As illustrated in Figure 15, this threat is relevant in systems that make 
use of password authentication, but where failed login attempts threshold is not set. If a 
target user account were to have a weak password, then a brute force attack could be effec-
tive for gaining access to the system. The harm that a successful attack could lead to depends 
on the specific account’s privileges. However, impact could range from loss of data confi-
dentiality and integrity to unavailability of the business service. SRP8a introduces multiple 
security requirements to reduce this risk: implementation of strong password policy, invalid 
login throttling mechanism (see Figure 16), and mandatory periodical renewal of passwords. 
 
Figure 14. SRP8a: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 15. SRP8a: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
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Figure 16. SRP8a: Security Requirements for Business Process 
SRP8b is almost identical to SRP8a with the only distinction being that the key space in this 
pattern is a finite key space consisting of default user credentials (see Table 33). These cre-
dentials can for example be the ones used by developers during development to access the 
system and for some reason the credentials have made it into production. As a risk mitiga-
tion, default accounts should simply be removed from the system. 
SRP8c is a sub-pattern of SRP8a that secures an IS from account lockout attacks (see Table 
34). Although there is no matching security threat pattern for this attack, we have provided 
this SRP for completeness purposes. SRP8a proposes a countermeasure design that sets a 
threshold for invalid login attempts. This countermeasure could be exploited by an attacker 
to lock legitimate users out of the system, making the business services unavailable for them 
(see Figure 18). The security criterion for this pattern is availability of business service for 
all legitimate users (see Figure 17). To mitigate the risk of this attack succeeding, SRP8c 
proposes implementation of an account lockout attack detection mechanism (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 17. SRP8c: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
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Figure 18. SRP8c: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 19. SRP8c: Security Requirements for Business Process 
4.3 Alignment of Security Risk-oriented Patterns with SREBP 
In chapter 2.3.1 we discussed the SREBP method in detail. However, we did not discuss 
how the security risk-oriented patterns fit into the five contextual areas. Figure 20 represents 
a revised illustration of the SREBP application method. We have categorized each SRP ac-
cording to the contextual area it corresponds to. Thus, each contextual area contains SRPs 
that mitigate risks and elicit security requirements relevant to the specific contextual state. 
 
Figure 20. Illustration of SREBP Application Method 
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4.4 Uzunov & Fernandez’s Threat Patterns Unsuitable for Securing Busi-
ness Processes 
Not all Uzunov and Fernandez’s threat patterns (2013) qualify for a respective security risk-
oriented pattern. In this subchapter we explain why some of the threat patterns are incom-
patible for securing business processes. 
Identity attacks that are unsuitable for securing business processes are listed in Table 9. The 
descriptions given for these threats do not describe an attack method. Because of this, it is 
not possible to explicitly model the flow of this attack in a business process. 
Table 9. Identity Threat Patterns Unsuitable for Securing Business Processes 
Threat category Security threat pattern 
Identity attacks UFP 1.1 Identity spoofing 
UFP 1.2 Advantageous identity allocation 
Network communication attacks that are unsuitable for securing business processes are 
listed in Table 10. UFPs 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.8 do not clearly describe the implementation of 
these attacks. UFPs 2.4 and 2.7 on the other hand do not explicitly specify the impact of 
these attacks. We are not claiming these are not relevant threats, but rather that that it is 
difficult to conclude the impact of these attacks using the CIA triad. 
Table 10. Network Communication Threat Patterns Unsuitable for Securing Business Processes 
Threat category Security threat pattern 
Network communications at-
tacks 
UFP 2.3 Message authenticity violation 
UFP 2.4 Traffic analysis, protocol sniffing 
UFP 2.5 Covert network channel 
UFP 2.6 Session hijacking 
UFP 2.7 Session state poisoning 
UFP 2.8 Route poisoning 
Network protocol attacks that are unsuitable for securing business processes are listed in 
Table 11. All of these patterns are technical and low-level. It is unlikely that most business 
analysts have comprehension about different network protocol types and purposes, not to 
mention protocol states and fields. Thus these threat patterns are unsuitable for mitigating 
security risks on a business process level. 
Table 11. Network Protocol Threat Patterns Unsuitable for Securing Business Processes 
Threat category Security threat pattern 
Network protocol attacks UFP 3.1 Message replay 
UFP 3.2 Message reuse 
UFP 3.3 Protocol field modification 
UFP 3.4 Use of abnormal packet sizes 
UFP 3.5 Use of abnormal packet sequencing (reordering) 
UFP 3.6 Use of reserved protocol packets 
UFP 3.7 Protocol initial/end state exploitation 
Remote information inference attacks that are unsuitable for securing business processes are 
listed in Table 12. Although the attack methods for these threat patterns are clearly de-
scribed, none of these threat patterns describe the impact of the attacks. For example, it is 
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not clear which business assets are harmed and how by gathering information (e.g., type of 
operating system being used) about a system. We agree that this information may in some 
cases be beneficial to an attacker, if employed in a manner that violates some security crite-
rion. 
Table 12. Remote Information Inference Threat Patterns Unsuitable for Securing Business Processes 
Threat category Security threat pattern 
Remote information inference UFP 6.1 Scanning (information gathering) 
UFP 6.2 Probing (vulnerability checking) 
UFP 6.4 Data inference 
There is only one accountability loss attack that is unsuitable for securing business processes 
(see Table 13). The description given for UFP 7.2 describes the impact, but does not de-
scribe an attack method. Therefore we cannot form a security risk-oriented pattern passed 
on this threat. 
Table 13. Accountability Loss Threat Patterns Unsuitable for Securing Business Processes 
Threat category Security threat pattern 
Loss of accountability UFP 7.2 Repudiation 
Uncontrolled operations attacks that are unsuitable for securing business processes are listed 
in Table 14. The descriptions of UFPs 8.3 and 8.5 do not specify the impact of these attacks. 
The description of UFP 8.4 on the other hand does not explicitly state the attack method. 
The TOCTOU attack that is described by UFP 8.7 is a low-level systematic attack, thus it 
does not fit well into a business process. 
Table 14. Uncontrolled Operations Threat Patterns Unsuitable for Securing Business Processes 
Threat category Security threat pattern 
Uncontrolled operations UFP 8.3 Spoofing privileged processes (transitive actions) 
UFP 8.4 Unsafe code execution 
UFP 8.5 Exploitation of tight component coupling 
UFP 8.7 Exploiting concurrency flaws 
Cryptography attacks that are unsuitable for securing business processes are listed in Table 
15. These attacks target weaknesses in cryptographic measures (e.g., weak algorithms, vul-
nerable security protocols etc.). The best way to mitigate these attacks is to avoid using 
vulnerable cryptographic countermeasures in the first place. Also, another reason why these 
threats are irrelevant for us is that business analysts normally do not have the final word 
about which security control methods are implemented in order to satisfy the security re-
quirements. This is a job best left for a security analyst. 
Table 15. Cryptography Threat Patterns Unsuitable for Securing Business Processes 
Threat category Security threat pattern 
Cryptography attacks UFP 9.1 Forging cryptographic credentials 
UFP 9.2 Abuse of weak algorithm 
UFP 9.3 Exploiting vulnerable security protocol 
Countermeasure design attacks that are unsuitable for securing business processes are listed 
in Table 16. Once again, these attacks have little to do with security requirements, because 
they are just poor choice or implementation of security controls. 
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Table 16. Countermeasure Design Threat Patterns Unsuitable for Securing Business Processes 
Threat category Security threat pattern 
Countermeasure design UFP 10.2 Bypassing controls 
UFP 10.3 Leveraging authorization model 
Configuration/administration attacks (see Table 17) are also irrelevant for us, because poor 
system configuration and administration cannot be (and should not be) mended by adding 
additional security requirements in a business process. 
Table 17. Configuration/administration Threat Patterns Unsuitable for Securing Business Processes 
Threat category Security threat pattern 
Configuration/administration UFP 11.1 Exploiting bad policies 
UFP 11.2 Unauthorized modification of rights (meta-authorization poli-
cies) 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter we divided the SRPs up into numerous smaller patterns to explicitly express 
which security threats the patterns address. We also expanded the library of SRPs with ad-
ditional patterns that target security risks which had not yet been mitigated. We gave expla-
nations on why some security threats are not applicable for securing business processes. 
Finally, we explained how the SRPs fit into the five contextual areas of SREBP.
  
5 Validation 
The thesis at hand explores ways to expand the library of security risk-oriented patterns to 
support the development of secure distributed system. In chapter 4 we proposed revisions 
to the security risk-oriented patterns library. The current chapter is dedicated to validation 
of our contributions to the library. It explains the validation method we applied, the valida-
tion results and potential threats to validity. 
5.1 Validation Method 
The research goal of this study is to understand what the applicability of the security risk-
oriented patterns (SRPs) is for securing business processes in distributed systems. Figure 21 
describes the validation method. We apply the revised security risk-oriented patterns to five 
business processes derived from real life scenarios in the aviation industry. These five pro-
cesses were inspired by a turnaround process by (Nõukas, 2015). The processes are the fol-
lowing: (i) passenger check-in, (ii) baggage check-in, (iii) fuel service form issuing, (iv) fuel 
service form requesting and (v) loading instruction form requesting. Prior to engineering 
security requirements for the processes, their preciseness was verified by an expert from 
Tallinn University of Technology who has experience with business processes used in the 
airline industry. After application of the security risk-oriented patterns, we submitted the 
resulting security requirements to the same expert for evaluation. 
 
Figure 21. Flow of the Validation Process 
In the following sub-chapter and in appendix III, we discuss the origination of each business 
process, present them using the BPMN modelling language and secure them by applying 
the necessary security risk-oriented patterns. We depict the security requirements for each 
process in security risk-aware BPMN models as well as in tabular form, where we also 
propose some potential control methods. For the passenger check-in process we apply each 
SRP separately and present the resulting risk and security requirements in separate models. 
This should help the reader better understand why each security requirement exists in the 
final security requirements model. For the other processes we only present a final model 
where all the security requirements are depicted.  
5.2 Securing the Passenger Check-in Process 
Figure 22 depicts a BPMN model of the passenger check-in process. This example scenario 
is based on airBaltic’s online check-in process1. In this scenario, the passenger confirms 
their attendance on a flight via the Internet. The passenger enters their booking number and 
other required information (e.g., preferred seating, meal options etc.) and submits the data 
                                                 
1 https://www.airbaltic.com/en/online-check-in-conditions 
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to the server. The server verifies the validity of the booking number. If the booking number 
is valid, the submitted information is stored in a data store and a boarding pass is issued to 
the passenger.  
 
Figure 22. Passenger Check-in Process 
We illustrate the application of SRP2a to the passenger check-in business process below. 
The models from application of the other SRPs are located in appendix III. Figure 23 and 
Figure 24 depict the risk analysis models from applying SRP2a. Figure 23 depicts a risk 
where an attacker intercepts the transmission between the passenger and the server by acting 
as a proxy. The attacker captures the passenger information being transmitted and keeps it 
for personal use. The impact of this attack is the loss of the passenger information’s confi-
dentiality. 
 
Figure 23. SRP2a: Security Risk-oriented Process Model (Business Asset: Passenger info) 
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Figure 24 addresses the same risk, but in this case the business asset is the boarding pass 
that is sent by the server to the passenger. An attacker again intercepts the transmission and 
this time captures the boarding pass. As a result, the boarding pass loses its confidentiality. 
 
Figure 24. SRP2a: Security Risk-oriented Process Model (Business Asset: Boarding pass) 
The security requirements for mitigating both of these risks are depicted on Figure 25. Be-
fore the passenger info is sent to the server, it is made unreadable for attackers (i.e., en-
crypted). Even if an attacker captures the encrypted information, the confidentiality of the 
passenger information remains intact. Similarly, before the server sends the boarding pass 
to the passenger, the boarding pass is made unreadable for attackers. These requirements 
ensure the confidentiality of both, the passenger information and the boarding pass during 
the transmission process. 
 
Figure 25. SRP2a: Security Requirements for Business Process 
  
 
Figure 26. Security Requirements for Passenger Check-in Process 
  
 
Figure 26 presents a BPMN model of the final security requirements for the passenger 
check-in process. Table 18 contains the security requirements for the passenger check-in 
process together with respective control methods. 
Table 18. Security Requirements for Passenger Check-in Process 
Req. ID Security Requirement  Control 
M1.SRP2a.1 Make passenger info unreadable to attackers during 
transmission between client and server 
Encryption algorithm 
M1.SRP2a.2 Make boarding pass unreadable to attackers during 
transmission between client and server 
M1.SRP5c.1 Make passenger info invisible before storing in data 
store 
Encryption algorithm, monitor 
data access 
M1.SRP4a.1 Filter abnormal requests at the server Firewall, DoS Defence System 
M1.SRP2b.1 Verify integrity of passenger info after transmission Checksum algorithm 
 M1.SRP2b.2 Verify integrity of boarding pass after transmission 
M1.SRP3a.1 
 
Filter input after receiving passenger check-in request Filter input for special characters 
and keywords, use whitelist of ac-
ceptable inputs 
M1.SRP5a.1 
 
Monitor the data store at Server for malicious changes Monitor and verify database sig-
nature changes 
M1.SRP6.1 Filter confidential information from error messages 
and standard responses 
Disable debug messages, use 
default error messages or error 
pages 
5.3 Threats to Validity 
Our validation method contains some degree of subjectivity. Throughout the validation pro-
cess we only asked the opinion of one expert. Although we trust the feedback we received, 
opinions by nature are subjective and it would be good to collect opinions from other experts 
too. 
Another limitation of our validation method is that we applied the security patterns only to 
five business processes. Although the processes are based on real life scenarios, they do not 
represent a sample of all the existing business processes. It would be interesting to apply the 
security patterns to business processes from other industries besides aviation, to see how 
well they conform in a different environment.  
What should also be considered is that the security patterns were applied to the example 
business processes by the author of the patterns. Different people may have different obser-
vations of the security patterns applicability. It would be interesting to also get feedback 
from someone unfamiliar with the SRPs who has applied them to a business process. 
The business processes we performed our validation on were created by the author of the 
security risk-oriented patterns. Although we do not consider this a real threat, as the business 
processes describe life scenarios and were also validated by an expert, it is still worth noting. 
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5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Expert’s Feedback 
The expert’s feedback to the secured business processes was approving. Security require-
ments suggested by the security patterns are relevant for reducing risks. The expert ex-
pressed confidence that our revised library of security risk-oriented patterns could be taken 
as a base for future development of a security patterns catalogue. 
5.4.2 Observations 
We made the following observations after application of the security risk-oriented patterns: 
 The following SRPs could not be applied in any of the five business processes: 
SRP4b - Secure business services against resource exhaustion attacks. The one common 
resource in the five business processes is the data store. If an attacker performs many 
database connection pool entries at the same time, it is possible that it could affect the 
availability of a business service. However, we already apply SRP4a in all of the busi-
ness processes which filters abnormal requests to the server. Thus in these five business 
processes SPR4b is not needed. We are still positive however, that SRP4b could be ap-
plicable in some business processes where users have more control over the system re-
sources. 
SRP7 - Protect business services from deadlock attacks. We could not pinpoint any-
where in any of the business processes where this attack could be possible. Therefore, 
we cannot confirm this pattern’s applicability. It could potentially be applied in a more 
complex business processes where there are many competing processes dependent on 
one-another. 
SRP8a - Secure system from brute force password attacks. 
SRP8b - Secure system from unauthorized access through common or default usernames 
and passwords. 
SRP8c - Secure the system from account lockout attacks. Unfortunately, none of the five 
business processes used passwords as a method of authentication. Therefore, we could 
not apply patterns SRP8a, SRP8b and SRP8b anywhere. We are still confident however, 
that these patterns are applicable in business processes that implement password authen-
tication. 
 The sequence of the security requirements can be different in business process models 
than it is in reality. When arranging the sequence of the security requirements in the 
business process models, we relied on a logical approach. For example, in the fuel ser-
vice form issuing process (see Figure 78) we described, that the server verifies the in-
tegrity of fuel quantity info before proceeding with making the fuel quantity info reada-
ble. However, in reality it could be that the implementation chosen to satisfy these re-
quirements performs message encryption and authentication in a reverse order (Kraw-
czyk, 2001). There may be other security controls that can alter the sequence of security 
requirements as well. It is important that the sequence of the security requirements in a 
business process does not limit the choice between security controls. Thus it is necessary 
to explain to implementers of the business process, that the sequence of the security 
requirements depicted on a business process model may not always represent the end 
result. 
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6 Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the answers to our research questions, discusses the limitations of 
the work and proposes objectives for future research. 
6.1 Answers to Research Questions 
In this thesis we were looking for answers to four research questions. The results of the 
thesis enable us to now answer these questions. 
RQ: How can the library of security risk-oriented patterns be expanded to support develop-
ment of secure distributed systems? This was the primary research question of our study. 
We explored two approaches on how the library of security risk-oriented patterns could be 
expanded. The goal of the first approach was to provide security risk-oriented patterns that 
would target security threats individually. The goal of the second approach was to produce 
additional security risk-oriented patterns to provide mitigations for security threats that were 
currently not addressed.  
RQ1: Which security threats do the security risk-oriented patterns correspond to? We 
aligned the existing security risk-oriented patterns against the threat patterns taxonomy by 
Uzunov & Fernandez (2013). From this we observed, that the five original security risk-
oriented patterns address altogether ten security threats. These security threats are the fol-
lowing: (i) invoking unauthorized operations, (ii) message secrecy violation, (iii) message 
integrity violation, (iv) injection, (v) process overflow attack, (vi) message flooding, (vii) 
resource exhaustion, (viii) corruption, (ix) track erasing, and (x) unauthorized access. In this 
thesis we propose new security risk-oriented patterns that address each of these security 
threats individually. These security patterns support more effective engineering of security 
in distributed systems, because they enable business analysts to explicitly mitigate risks that 
are actual in a specific business process. 
RQ2: Which additional security risks and countermeasures should be considered to be able 
to apply security risk-oriented patterns for securing business processes in distributed sys-
tems? We identified five additional security threats that should be considered when securing 
business processes in distributed systems. These threats are the following: (i) output infor-
mation disclosure, (ii) targeted process crashing, (iii) password attacks (guessing, brute 
force, rainbow tables, etc.), (iv) use of default credentials, and (v) account lockout attack. 
Based on these security threats, we created five security risk-oriented patterns that provide 
countermeasures for each of these threats.  
RQ3: What is the applicability of the security risk-oriented patterns in distributed systems? 
We examined the applicability of the security risk-oriented patterns in five business pro-
cesses from the aviation industry. The business processes were developed based on a turn-
around process described by (Nõukas, 2015). We applied the security risk-oriented patterns 
to the business processes using the SREBP methodology. The business processes were then 
enhanced with security requirements derived from the security patterns and presented using 
the security risk-aware BPMN modelling language. We submitted the secured business pro-
cesses for review to an expert from Tallinn University of Technology who has experience 
with business processes used in the airline industry. Our validation efforts confirmed the 
applicability of eleven security risk-oriented patterns out of sixteen. 
6.2 Limitations 
As we learned from the validation chapter, we could not confirm the applicability of five 
security risk-oriented patterns. We are positive however, that this does not necessarily mean 
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they are inapplicable in business processes. Rather, the example business processes did not 
expose those specific risks.  
6.3 Future work 
Although throughout this thesis we managed to expand the library of security risk-oriented 
patterns to support development of secure distributed systems, the library still does not ad-
dress all the security threats out there. As we already discussed in chapter 3, there are other 
resources available for threat patterns besides Uzunov & Fernandez’s threat pattern library 
(2013). Some best-known examples are Mitre’s CAPEC and Microsoft’s STRIDE. We 
would like to investigate both of these repositories in order to expand the security patterns 
library even further.  
We would also like to test the applicability of the security risk-oriented patterns in other 
environments besides the aviation industry in order to see how well they perform. This could 
potentially provide us with verification of the applicability of the security patterns that were 
not applied in the airline business processes. 
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Appendix 
The appendix includes all the additional material developed throughout this thesis. It is di-
vided into four sections. They are the following: 
I. BPMN Models of Security Risk-oriented Patterns. This appendix contains all the 
asset, risk and risk-treatment models developed during the revision of security risk-
oriented patterns (see chapter 4.1). 
II. Conformation of Security Risk-oriented Patterns and Uzunov and Fernandez’s 
Threat Patterns. This appendix contains the tabular alignment of all the security 
risk-oriented patterns to (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) threat patterns (see chapters 
4.1 and 4.2).  
III. Application of Security Risk-oriented Patterns to Five Example Business Pro-
cesses. This appendix includes the additional risk and risk-treatment models devel-
oped during the validation process (see chapter 5.1). It also contains the descriptions 
of the four other aviation business processes used for validation. 
IV. License. This is the non-exclusive licence that permits the reproduction and publi-
cation of this thesis. 
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I. BPMN Models of Security Risk-oriented Patterns 
SRP1a 
This pattern secures data from unauthorized access. 
 
Figure 27. SRP1a: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 28. SRP1a: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 29. SRP1a: Security Requirements for Business Process 
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SRP1b 
This pattern protects business services from unauthorized access. 
 
Figure 30. SRP1b: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 31. SRP1b: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 32. SRP1b: Security Requirements for Business Process 
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SRP2a 
This pattern helps ensure data confidentiality during transmission between business entities. 
 
Figure 33. SRP2a: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 34. SRP2a: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 35. SRP2a: Security Requirements for Business Process 
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SRP2b 
This pattern helps ensure data integrity during transmission between business entities. 
 
Figure 36. SRP2b: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 37. SRP2b: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 38. SRP2b: Security Requirements for Business Process 
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SRP3a 
This pattern secures business activities from injection of malicious scripts. 
 
Figure 39. SRP3a: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 40. SRP3a: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 41. SRP3a: Security Requirements for Business Process
  
SRP3b 
This pattern secures business activities from buffer overflow attacks. The security objectives 
and requirements in this pattern are identical to SRP3a. 
 
Figure 42. SRP3a and SRP3b: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 43. SRP3b: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 44.  SRP3b: Security Requirements for Business Process
  
SRP4a 
This pattern secures business services against message flooding attacks. 
 
Figure 45. SRP4a: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 46. SRP4a: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 47. SRP4a: Security Requirements for Business Process 
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SRP4b 
This pattern secures business services against resource exhaustion attacks. The security 
objectives of this pattern are identical with SRP4a. 
 
Figure 48. SRP4b: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 49. SRP4b: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 50. SRP4b: Security Requirements for Business Process  
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SRP5a 
This pattern helps secure data in data store from corruption. 
 
Figure 51. SRP5a: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 52. SRP5a: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 53. SRP5a: Security Requirements for Business Process
  
SRP5b 
This pattern helps secure the integrity of auditing information. The security objectives and 
requirements for this pattern are identical to SRP5a. 
 
Figure 54. SRP5b: Business Process Model with Security Objectives 
 
Figure 55. SRP5b: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 56. SRP5b: Security Requirements for Business Process 
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SRP5c 
This pattern secures data in data store from unauthorized access by malicious insiders. 
 
Figure 57. SRP5c: Business Process Model with Security Objectives   
 
Figure 58. SRP5c: Security Risk-oriented Business Process Model 
 
Figure 59. SRP5c: Security Requirements for Business Process 
  
II. Conformation of Security Risk-oriented Patterns and Uzunov and Fernandez’s Threat Patterns 
Table 19. Conformation of SRP1a and UFP 8.2, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) and (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat pattern for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP1a. Secure data from unauthorized access UFP 8.2 Invoking unauthorized operations (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, 
Table 9) 
Business asset Data stored in server and requested by user Operations 
IS asset Input interface, transmission channel, server User interaction, e.g., input ports 
Distribution control 
Resource management 
Security criteria Data confidentiality  
Impact Loss of data confidentiality, compromise of business  
Threat An attacker gets hold of confidential data A software component invokes operations on another component without 
being authorized to do so. 
Threat agent An attacker acting as a client with the intention of getting a hold of confi-
dential data on the server 
Attack method Request confidential data from the server by appearing as a client. Exploit 
data: read and save for personal use 
Vulnerability Lack of access permission checks at the server 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Perform access permission checks for data retrieval by clients Authorization 
Control Define user levels with appropriate access authorization with credentials, 
monitor data access 
 
 
  
Table 20. Conformation of SRP1b and UFP 8.2, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) and (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat pattern for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP1b. Secure business service from unauthorized access UFP 8.2 Invoking unauthorized operations (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, 
Table 9) 
Business asset Business service Operations 
IS asset Input interface, transmission channel, server User interaction, e.g., input ports 
Distribution control 
Resource management 
Security criteria Confidentiality of business process  
Impact   
Threat An attacker gets access to business service without being authorized to do 
so 
A software component invokes operations on another component without 
being authorized to do so. 
Threat agent An attacker acting as a client with the intention of using a business service 
Attack method Request business service from the server by appearing as a client. 
Vulnerability Lack of access permission checks at the server 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Perform access permission checks for business process access by clients Authorization 
Control Define user levels with appropriate access authorization with credentials, 
monitor business service access 
 
  
Table 21. Conformation of SRP2a and UFP 2.1, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) and (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat patterns for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP2a. Secure data from secrecy violation during transmission between 
business entities 
UFP 2.1 Message secrecy violation (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 3) 
Business asset Data being transmitted Messages 
IS asset Input interface, transmission channel, server Communication, i.e., message channels, networking infrastructure 
Security crite-
ria 
Confidentiality of data Secrecy 
Impact Harm of business asset (data), loss of data confidentiality  
Threat An attacker intercepts the transmission medium by acting as a proxy Messages in transit are intercepted and their contents read by an attacker 
Threat agent An attacker with an intention of intercepting the transmission medium by 
acting as a proxy between the input interface and the server 
Attack method Interception of transmission medium by installation of a proxy between in-
put interface and server. Misuse of transmitted data: capture, read, store 
Vulnerability Vulnerability of the transmission method to be intercepted 
Poor encryption algorithm, or lack of encryption being used at the input in-
terface and the server  
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security re-
quirement 
Make data unreadable to attacker 
 
Secure communication 
Control Encryption algorithm Message encryption 
 
  
  
Table 22. Conformation of SRP2b and UFP 2.2, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) and (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat patterns for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP2b. Secure data from integrity violation during transmission between 
business entities 
UFP 2.2 Message integrity violation (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 3) 
Business asset Data being transmitted Messages 
IS asset Input interface, transmission channel, server Communication, i.e., message channels, networking infrastructure 
Security crite-
ria 
Integrity of data Integrity 
Impact Harm of business asset (data), loss of data integrity  
Threat An attacker intercepts the transmission medium by acting as a proxy Messages in transit are intercepted and modified, replaced, corrupted or 
simply deleted by an attacker 
Threat agent An attacker with an intention of intercepting the transmission medium by 
acting as a proxy between the input interface and the server 
Attack method Interception of transmission medium by installation of a proxy between in-
put interface and server. Misuse of transmitted data: capture, modify and 
pass to the server 
Vulnerability Vulnerability of the transmission medium to be intercepted 
Poor or lack of message integrity validation at the server  
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security re-
quirement 
Verify integrity of the received data Secure communication 
Control Checksum algorithm Message hashing, error detection codes 
  
Table 23. Conformation of SRP3a and UFP 4.1, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) and (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat pattern for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP3a. Secure business activity from injection attacks UFP 4.1 Injection (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 5) 
Business asset Data being entered, business service Messages 
IS asset Input interface, transmission channel, server Communication, i.e., messages 
User interaction, i.e., input ports 
Data/storage management 
Distribution control 
Security criteria Integrity and confidentiality of data, integrity and availability of business 
service 
 
Impact Harm of business asset (data), loss of data confidentiality and integrity, 
malicious scripts stored in server, loss of business service availability and 
integrity 
 
Threat An attacker submits malicious scripts to the server The attacker manipulates the input and passes arbitrary data to a target 
component that Will be processed as normal data. The injected data may 
include binary code, SQL statements, XML, OS commands etc. Threat agent An attacker capable of writing malicious scripts (e.g. SQL and xPath injec-
tions) 
Attack method Submit malicious scripts to the server by acting as a client. Misuse of data: 
take, read and store data, alter or delete data stored in server. Misuse of 
business service: make business service unavailable 
Vulnerability Poor or lack of input filtering at the input interface and server 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Filter input at input interface and server Filtering, Storage security 
Control Filter input for special characters and keywords, use whitelist of accepta-
ble inputs 
Input filtering 
 
  
Table 24. Conformation of SRP3b and UFP 8.6, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) and (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat pattern for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP3b. Secure business activity from buffer overflow attacks UFP 8.6 Process overflow attack (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 5) 
Business asset Data being entered, business service Messages 
IS asset Input interface, transmission channel, server User interaction, i.e., input ports 
Data/storage management, i.e., data structures 
Distribution control, i.e., software component interfaces, execution ab-
stractions, processes 
Security criteria Integrity and confidentiality of data, integrity and availability of business 
service 
 
Impact Unexpected behaviour, loss of data integrity and confidentiality, loss of 
business service integrity and availability 
 
Threat An attacker triggers a buffer overflow in the system, causing unexpected 
behaviour or redirection of execution 
An attacker injects arbitrary binary code into the process execution envi-
ronment that will overflow certain pre-defined boundaries and allow control 
to be passed to that code. 
Threat agent An attacker aware of overflow weakness in software 
Attack method An attacker triggers an integer overflow by entering an non-conforming in- 
put into a business activity 
Vulnerability Missing bounds checking in software, poor or lack of input filtering at the 
input interface and server 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Filter input at input interface and server2 
Implement boundary checking2 
Execution control 
Control Filter input for special character and keywords2 
Use whitelist of acceptable inputs2 
Ensure numeric input is in expected range2 
Buffer overflow prevention 
 
                                                 
2 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/190.html 
  
Table 25. Conformation of SRP4a and UFP 2.9, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) and (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat pattern for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP4a. Secure business services against message flooding attacks UFP 2.9 Message flooding (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 3) 
Business asset Request from client Business service 
IS asset Transmission channel, server Communication, i.e., message channels, networking infrastructure 
Security criteria Availability of business service Availability 
Impact Simultaneous requests keep the server busy and lead to unavailability of 
business service 
 
Threat An attacker performs many simultaneous requests to the server making 
the server available to normal users 
A large stream of messages is injected into a new or existing communica-
tion stream to degrade the network performance or interrupt the normal 
service of a target node or component. 
Threat agent An attacker with an access to a large number of computers and capable of 
performing simultaneous requests 
Attack method Create many simultaneous requests to the server thus making the busi-
ness service unavailable (DDoS attack) 
Vulnerability Poor or lacking checks for abnormal requests at the server 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Filter abnormal requests at the server Filtering, Secure communication, Logging and monitoring 
Control Use firewall, DoS Defence System Network level firewall, IDS  
  
Table 26. Conformation of SRP4b and UFP 8.8, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) and (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat pattern for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP4b. Secure business services against resource exhaustion attacks UFP 8.8 Resource exhaustion (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 9) 
Business asset Business service, request from client  
IS asset Transmission channel, server, input interface Data/storage management, i.e., storage abstractions, database systems, 
file systems 
Resource management 
Distribution control, i.e., execution abstractions, processes 
Security criteria Availability of business service Availability 
Impact Simultaneous requests keep the server busy and lead to unavailability of 
business service 
 
Threat An attacker triggers allocation of resource(s) (e.g., memory, file system 
storage, database connection pool entries, CPU) that leads to unavailabil-
ity of business service for normal users 
A system is saturated with resource requests, or resources are used ex-
cessively (e.g. memory hogging applications). 
Threat agent An attacker who is aware of poor or lack of resource restrictions, or a 
memory leak 
Attack method Trigger allocation of resources thus slowing down business services re-
sponse times and/or causing unavailability of business service 
Vulnerability Software does not properly restrict the size or amount of resources utilized 
by an actor because of error conditions, exceptional circumstances or con-
fusion over which component is responsible for releasing the resource 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture that limit the 
amount of resources an unauthorized user can allocate3 
Strong authentication and access control3 
Resource exhaustion detection mechanism that exposes the attack and 
blocks the attacker3 
Execution control 
Control Uniformly throttled requests3 Quotas and limits 
                                                 
3 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html 
  
Table 27. Conformation of SRP5a and UFP 5.1, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) and (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat patterns for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP5a. Secure data in data store from corruption UFP 5.1 Corruption (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 6) 
Business asset Data stored in server, business service Data, business service 
IS asset Data input/output interface, transmission channel, server Data/storage management, e.g., storage 
Security criteria Data integrity, availability of business service Integrity of system state, availability of business service 
Impact Loss of data integrity, loss of business service availability, compromise of 
business 
 
Threat An attacker modifies or deletes confidential data The attacker modifies stored data on persistent or transient storage. The 
corrupted data can be a cause for corruption of state in the system, or 
can be used for denial-of-service (e.g. if the data is sensitive configura-
tion data that is rendered useless). 
Threat agent A malicious insider misusing access to the server and manipulating confi-
dential data 
Attack method Modify or delete confidential data by using access to the disk, causing 
loss of data integrity and possibly loss of business service availability  
Vulnerability Poor or lack of data integrity checks 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Implement database integrity defence mechanism with dual level signa-
tures (Barbará et al., 2000) 
Storage security 
Control Monitor data access, monitor and verify database signature changes 
(Barbará et al., 2000) 
Hashing, integrity checks, secure backup 
 
  
  
Table 28. Conformation of SRP5b and UFP 7.1, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) and (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat patterns for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP5b. Secure the integrity of auditing information UFP 7.1 Track erasing (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 8) 
Business asset Data stored in server Auditing information 
IS asset Data input/output interface, transmission channel, server Data/storage management, i.e., database systems, file systems 
Security criteria Data integrity Integrity 
Impact Loss of data integrity, compromise of business  
Threat An attacker modifies or deletes confidential auditing data An attacker modifies or deletes auditing information to erase the tracks of 
an attack. 
Threat agent A malicious insider misusing access to the server and manipulating confi-
dential data 
Attack method Perform malicious operations on the data in database. After attack edit or 
delete any auditing information that might trace the attack 
Vulnerability Poor or lack of data integrity checks 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Implement database integrity defence mechanism with dual level signa-
tures (Barbará et al., 2000) 
Logging and monitoring 
 
Control Monitor data access, monitor and verify database signature changes (Bar-
bará et al., 2000) 
Secure system logs, replicated logs 
 
  
  
Table 29. Conformation of SRP5c and UFP 8.1, adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2013) and (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat patterns for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP5c. Secure data in data store from unauthorized access UFP 8.1 Unauthorized access (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 9) 
Business asset Data stored in server Data 
IS asset Data input/output interface, transmission channel, server User interaction, e.g., input ports 
Resource management, e.g., resources 
Data/storage management, e.g., storage abstractions, database systems, 
file systems 
Security criteria Data confidentiality  
Impact Loss of data confidentiality, compromise of business  
Threat An attacker gets hold of confidential data A user gains access to data or resources without proper authorization 
Threat agent A malicious insider misusing access to the server and retrieving confiden-
tial data 
Attack method Retrieve confidential data from the server using assigned credentials. Ex-
ploit data: read and save for personal use 
Vulnerability Poor or lack of data invisibility 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Ensure invisibility of confidential data Authorization 
Control Encryption algorithm, monitor data access  
 
  
  
Table 30. Conformation of SRP6 and UFP 6.3, adapted from (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat pattern for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP6. Prevent harm to business service through leakage of confidential in-
formation via error and standard response messages 
UFP 6.3 Output information disclosure (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 
7) 
Business asset Business service Information 
IS asset Input interface, Server User interaction (i.e. output ports) 
Distribution control (i.e. all aspects related to component collaboration or in-
teraction, coordination of local/remote execution and synchronization) 
Security criteria Availability of business service, integrity and confidentiality of data Confidentiality 
Impact Compromise of business, unavailability of business service, integrity and 
confidentiality of data 
 
Threat An attacker intentionally causes the system to produce an error or a stand-
ard response message which contains sensitive information from the sys-
tem (e.g. system configuration, credentials or private information) that the 
attacker can use to launch new attacks 
Information from the system is leaked to the attacker via some form of out-
put, such as error messages or standard responses 
Threat agent An attacker who is able to trigger a leakage of confidential information from 
the system through an error or standard response message and use this in-
formation to launch new attacks 
Attack method Trigger an error or a standard response message from the system. Use 
gained information to launch new attacks. 
Vulnerability Server does not filter confidential information from error messages/standard 
responses 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Filter confidential information from error messages/standard responses4 
Configure server software so that confidential information does not leak4 
Filtering 
Control Parse server messages before passing to user4 
Disable debug messages4 
Specify error messages such that no sensitive data is sent4 
Capture all exceptions and return generic error messages4 
Use default error messages or error pages that do not leak information4 
Output limitation 
                                                 
4 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/209.html 
  
Table 31. Conformation of SRP7 and UFP 8.9, adapted from (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat pattern for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP7. Protect business service from deadlock attacks UFP 8.9 Targeted process crashing (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 9) 
Description This pattern secures the system from deadlock attacks where multiple pro-
cesses are initiated that become dependent on one-another to finish, caus-
ing the service to become unavailable for regular users. 
 
Business asset Request from client, business service Process 
IS asset Input interface, Server Resource management, e.g., resources 
Distribution control, e.g., execution abstractions, processes 
Security criteria Availability of business service Availability 
Impact Unavailability of business service  
Threat An attacker triggers a deadlock situation and causes unavailability of the 
business service 
A process is purposefully exploited to crash, losing availability 
for the rest of the system 
Threat agent An attacker with knowledge of deadlock situations at the server and an in-
tention to trigger them 
Attack method Trigger two or more competing processes that will wait for each other to fin-
ish 
Vulnerability Simultaneous processes are not synchronized at the server 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Synchronize the execution and operation of simultaneous processes5 Execution control 
Control Use non-blocking synchronization algorithms and/or libraries that imple-
ment synchronization5 
Process replication 
 
                                                 
5 https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/25.html 
  
Table 32. Conformation of SRP8a and UFP 9.4, adapted from (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat pattern for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP8a. Secure the system from brute force password attacks UFP 9.4 Password attacks (guessing, brute force, rainbow tables, etc.) (Uz-
unov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 10) 
Business asset Data, business services Passwords 
IS asset Input interface, server  
Security criteria Confidentiality and integrity of data 
Availability of business services 
 
Impact Loss of data confidentiality and integrity, loss of business service’s availa-
bility 
 
Threat An attacker with knowledge of at least one username in the system uses a 
dictionary-based or an alphabet-based brute force attack to gain access to 
the system 
An attacker acquires passwords easily (e.g. passed as plaintext) or takes 
advantage of incorrect password storage (lack of salting and stretching). 
Threat agent An attacker with knowledge of at least one username in the system 
Attack method An attacker tries each entry in a dictionary or any possible value using a 
given alphabet as password to gain access to the system using an existing 
user account 
Vulnerability System uses one factor password based authentication 
System has weak or no password policy 
System does not implement password throttling mechanism 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Block user after certain number of failed login attempts6 
 
 
Control Password throttling mechanism6 
Enforce strong password policy to ensure users use strong passwords6 
Enforce users to change passwords after a given time period6 
 
                                                 
6 https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html 
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Table 33. Conformation of SRP8b and UFP 10.1, adapted from (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013) 
 Security risk-oriented pattern Threat pattern for distributed systems 
Pattern SRP8b. Protect system from unauthorized access through common or de-
fault usernames and passwords 
UFP 10.1 Use of default credentials (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013, Table 11) 
Business asset Data, user accounts  
IS asset Input interface, Server  
Security criteria Integrity and confidentiality of data, availability of business service  
Impact Loss of data confidentiality, compromise of business  
Threat An attacker accesses the system using a common/default username and 
password and performs unauthorized actions 
An attacker uses default credentials for access or authentication. 
Threat agent An attacker with a collection of vendor default credentials and/or common 
usernames and passwords 
Attack method Try common and/or default usernames and passwords to gain access to 
the system 
Vulnerability System uses one factor password based authentication and there exist 
vendor default account credentials 
Risk treatment Risk reduction  
Security require-
ment 
Block user after certain number of failed login attempts
7
 
Deny access if user tries to authenticate using a default account
7
 
Identity management 
Control Delete all vendor account credentials from the system7 
Implement strong password policy
7
 
Make users change passwords after a set time period
7
 
Implement invalid login throttling mechanism
7
 
 
  
                                                 
7 https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/70.html 
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Table 34. SRP8c: Securing the system from account lockout attacks 
 Security risk-oriented pattern 
Pattern SRP8c. Secure the system from account lockout attacks 
Description This is a sub-pattern of SRP8a which prevents the exploitation of security mechanisms used for securing the system from brute force attacks. 
Business asset Business service 
IS asset Input interface, server 
Security criteria Availability of business service for specific user(s) 
Impact Unavailability of business service for legitimate user(s) 
Threat An attacker locks out legitimate users’ accounts, e.g. by entering invalid login credentials at the input interface for a given amount of times, thus exploiting 
the system’s lockout mechanism 
Threat agent An attacker with knowledge of at least one legitimate username 
Attack method The attacker behaves in a manner that results with a legitimate user being locked out of their own account (e.g. enters the wrong password for a given 
amount of times) 
Vulnerability The system has an account lockout mechanism 
Risk treatment Risk reduction 
Security require-
ment 
Detect account lockout attack and block the attacker8 
Control Intelligent password throttling mechanism that is able to detect account lockout attacks and block the attacker (e.g. based on IP address)8 
                                                 
8 https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/2.html 
  
III. Application of Security Risk-oriented Patterns to Five Example Busi-
ness Processes 
Passenger Check-in Process 
Below are rest of the risk-oriented and security requirements models resulting from the ap-
plication of the SRPs to the passenger check-in process. The models are grouped according 
to the SRPs that are applied in them. 
SRP2b 
 
Figure 60. SRP2b: Security Risk-oriented Process Model (Business Asset: Passenger Info) 
 
Figure 61. SRP2b: Security Risk-oriented Process Model (Business Asset: Boarding Pass) 
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Figure 62. SRP2b: Security Requirements for Business Process 
SRP3a & SRP3b 
 
Figure 63. SRP3a & SRP3b: Security Risk-oriented Process Model 
 
Figure 64. SRP3a & SRP3b: Security Requirements for Business Process 
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SRP4a 
 
Figure 65. SRP4a: Security Risk-oriented Process Model 
 
Figure 66. SRP4a: Security Requirements for Business Process 
SRP5a 
 
Figure 67. SRP5a: Security Risk-oriented Process Model 
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Figure 68. SRP5a: Security Requirements for Business Process 
SRP5b 
 
Figure 69. SRP5b: Security Risk-oriented Process Model 
 
Figure 70. SRP5b: Security Requirements for Business Process 
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SRP5c 
 
Figure 71. SRP5c: Security Risk-oriented Process Model 
 
Figure 72. SRP5c: Security Requirements for Business Process 
 
Figure 73. SRP6: Security Risk-oriented Process Model 
 
Figure 74. SRP6: Security Requirements for Business Process  
84 
 
Securing Baggage Check-in Process 
Figure 75 depicts the baggage check-in process. This example process is based on Brussels 
Airlines baggage check-in service9. The passenger enters their booking number, fills in the 
required information (e.g., number of bags) and submits it to the server. The server verifies 
the submitted information, stores it in a data store and issues bag tags for the passenger. 
 
Figure 75. Baggage Check-in Process 
Figure 76 presents a BPMN model of the final security requirements for the baggage check-
in process. Table 35 contains the security requirements for the baggage check-in process 
together with respective control methods. 
Table 35. Security Requirements for Baggage Check-in Process 
Req. ID Security Requirement  Control 
M2.SRP2a.1 Make baggage info unreadable to attackers during 
transmission between client and server 
Encryption algorithm 
M2.SRP2a.2 Make bag tags unreadable to attackers during trans-
mission between client and server 
M2.SRP2b.1 Verify integrity of baggage info after transmission Checksum algorithm 
M2.SRP2b.2 Verify integrity of bag tags after transmission 
M2.SRP4a.1 Filter abnormal requests at the server Firewall, DoS Defence System 
M2.SRP3a.1 
 
Filter input after receiving baggage check-in request Filter input for special characters 
and keywords, use whitelist of ac-
ceptable inputs 
M2.SRP5a.1 
 
Monitor the data store at the server for malicious 
changes 
Monitor and verify database signa-
ture changes 
M2.SRP6.1 Filter confidential information from error messages 
and standard responses 
Disable debug messages, use de-
fault error messages or error pages 
that do not leak information 
M2.SRP5c.1 Make baggage info invisible before storing in data 
store 
Encryption algorithm, monitor data 
access 
                                                 
9 https://www.brusselsairlines.com/en-se/misc/home-printed-baggage-tags.aspx 
  
 
Figure 76. Security Requirements for Baggage Check-in Process 
  
Securing Fuel Service Form Issuing Process 
Figure 77 depicts the fuel service form issuing process. This example is based on flight 
planning process descriptions shared by Airline Dispatchers Federation10 and a major U.S. 
airline pilot11. The flight dispatcher calculates the fuel quantity based on numerous variables 
such as flight distance, aircraft type, weather conditions etc. This information is sent to the 
server where it is stored and in turn sent to the pilot. The pilot checks the quantity and 
increases it if necessary. A fuel service form is issued then and stored in the server’s data 
store. 
 
Figure 77. Fuel Service Form Issuing Process 
Figure 78 presents a BPMN model of the final security requirements for the fuel service 
form issuing process. Table 36 contains the security requirements for the fuel service form 
issuing process together with respective control methods. 
                                                 
10 https://www.dispatcher.org/dispatcher/job-description 
11 http://www.myairlineflight.com/fueling.html 
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Table 36. Security Requirements for Fuel Service Form Issuing Process 
Req. ID Security Requirement  Control 
M3.SRP2a.1 Make fuel quantity info unreadable to attackers dur-
ing transmission between dispatcher and server 
Encryption algorithm 
M3.SRP2a.2 Make fuel quantity info unreadable to attackers dur-
ing transmission between pilot and server 
M3.SRP2a.3 Make fuel service form unreadable to attackers dur-
ing transmission between pilot and server 
M3.SRP2b.1 Verify integrity of fuel quantity information after 
transmission from dispatcher to server 
Checksum algorithm 
M3.SRP2b.2 Verify integrity of fuel quantity information after 
transmission from server to pilot 
M3.SRP2b.3 Verify integrity of fuel service form after transmission 
from pilot to server 
M3.SRP4a.1 Filter abnormal requests at the server Firewall, DoS Defence System 
M3.SRP3a.1 
 
Filter input after receiving fuel quantity information at 
the server 
Filter input for special characters 
and keywords, use whitelist of ac-
ceptable inputs 
M3.SRP5c.1 Make fuel quantity info invisible before storing in 
data store 
Encryption algorithm, monitor data 
access 
M3.SRP5c.1 Make fuel service form invisible before storing in 
data store 
M3.SRP5a.1 
 
Monitor the data store at Server for malicious 
changes 
Monitor and verify database signa-
ture changes 
  
 
Figure 78. Security Requirements for Fuel Service Form Issuing Process 
  
Securing Fuel Service Form Requesting Process 
Figure 79 depicts the fuel service form requesting process. This example is based on flight 
planning process descriptions by a major U.S. airline pilot12. In this process a fuel service 
form is requested using an input/output interface. The server receives the request, queries 
the data store for the requested information and returns it to the input/output interface. Fuel-
ling service can then be performed according to the quantity and fuel type information in 
the form. 
Figure 80 presents a BPMN model of the final security requirements for the fuel service 
form requesting process. Table 37 contains the security requirements for the fuel service 
form requesting process together with respective control methods. 
 
Figure 79. Fuel Service Form Requesting Process 
Table 37. Security Requirements for Fuel Service Form Requesting Process 
Req. ID Security Requirement  Control 
M4.SRP2a.1 Make fuel service form request unreadable to at-
tackers during transmission between input/output in-
terface and server 
Encryption algorithm 
M4.SRP2a.2 Make fuel service form unreadable to attackers dur-
ing transmission between input/output interface and 
server 
M4.SRP2b.1 Verify integrity of fuel service form request after 
transmission from input/output interface to server 
Checksum algorithm 
M4.SRP2b.2 Verify integrity of fuel service form after transmission 
from server to input/output interface 
M4.SRP4a.1 Filter abnormal requests at the server Firewall, DoS Defence System 
M4.SRP3a.1 
 
Filter input after receiving fuel service form request 
at the server 
Filter input for special characters 
and keywords, use whitelist of ac-
ceptable inputs 
M4.SRP5c.1 Make fuel service form visible after querying from 
data store 
Cryptographic algorithm 
M4.SRP5a.1 
 
Monitor the data store at Server for malicious 
changes 
Monitor and verify database signa-
ture changes 
M4.SRP1a.1 Check access rights before querying data store for 
fuel service form 
Define user levels with appropriate 
access authorization with creden-
tials, monitor data access 
                                                 
12 http://www.myairlineflight.com/fueling.html 
  
 
Figure 80. Security Requirements for Fuel Service Form Requesting Process 
  
Securing Loading Instruction Form Requesting Process 
Figure 81 depicts the loading instruction form requesting process which is one of the sub-
processes of airline ground operations. The example is based on SKYbrary’s13 (a repository 
of knowledge related to aviation processes) descriptions of the aircraft loading process. A 
loading instruction form that describes the load disposition in the aircraft is produced either 
by a dispatcher or an automated system. In order to begin loading the aircraft, a loading 
supervisor needs to request this information from the server. The server queries the re-
quested loading instruction form from a data store and returns it to the loading supervisor. 
 
Figure 81. Loading Instruction Form Requesting Process 
Figure 82 presents a BPMN model of the final security requirements for the loading instruc-
tion form requesting process. Table 38 contains the security requirements for the loading 
instruction form requesting process together with respective control methods. 
Table 38. Security Requirements for Loading Instruction Form Requesting Process 
Req. ID Security Requirement  Control 
M5.SRP2a.1 Make loading instruction form request unreadable 
to attackers during transmission between in-
put/output interface and server 
Encryption algorithm 
M5.SRP2a.2 Make loading instruction form unreadable to at-
tackers during transmission between input/output 
interface and server 
M5.SRP2b.1 Verify integrity of loading instruction form request 
after transmission from input/output interface to 
server 
Checksum algorithm 
M5.SRP2b.2 Verify integrity of loading instruction form after 
transmission from server to input/output interface 
M5.SRP4a.1 Filter abnormal requests at the server Firewall, DoS Defence System 
M5.SRP3a.1 
 
Filter input after receiving loading instruction form 
request at the server 
Filter input for special characters and 
keywords, use whitelist of acceptable 
inputs 
M5.SRP5c.1 Make loading instruction form visible after query-
ing from data store 
Cryptographic algorithm 
M5.SRP5a.1 
 
Monitor the data store at Server for malicious 
changes 
Monitor and verify database signa-
ture changes 
M5.SRP1a.1 Check access rights before querying data store for 
loading instruction form 
Define user levels with appropriate 
access authorization with credentials, 
monitor data access 
                                                 
13 http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Loading_of_Aircraft_Holds 
  
 
Figure 82. Security Requirements for Loading Instruction Form Requesting
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